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A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement  
 
David L. Markell* and Robert L. Glicksman* 
 
Abstract 
The law review literature has long-recognized that effective enforcement is an essential 
component of effective regulation.  Yet much of the literature focuses on one aspect of the 
enforcement challenge or another.   For example, the underlying theory about optimal levels of 
enforcement has received considerable attention, as have topics such as the relative merits of 
using deterrence-based versus cooperation-based approaches and the use of citizen suits. 
The purpose of this article is to fill a gap in the law review literature by considering 
agencies’ enforcement and compliance promotion function holistically.  In doing so, the article 
approaches the challenge from an “inside-out” perspective, a perspective that administrative law 
scholars have found to be lacking in the literature.   
The article proposes a three-layered conceptual framework for considering options for 
structuring the administrative agency enforcement and compliance promotion function.  The first 
layer consists of five components of effective enforcement and compliance:  norm clarity, norm 
achievability, verifiability, an appropriate mix of sanctions and rewards, and indicia of 
legitimacy.  The second involves the inter-related character of these components and highlights 
the importance of fitting each into a particular enforcement and compliance regime so that 
agencies may gain synergistic benefits and consider the need to make difficult trade-offs.  Third, 
and finally, our conceptual framework includes four contextual design issues that create 
additional challenges in determining the appropriate content of each of the five key components 
of effective enforcement and compliance:  the hybrid character of contemporary governance 
efforts; the importance of “reality-checking” enforcement options through close attention to past 
performance as well as future challenges and opportunities; the dynamic character of 
environmental governance challenges; and the salience of possible design changes and the need 
to prioritize design improvements.  The article suggests that it is important to consider all three 
layers in developing an effective enforcement and compliance promotion regime. 
The article tests our conceptual framework by including a case study of an ongoing 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) effort to reinvent its enforcement and compliance 
promotion program and by applying our framework to EPA’s initiative.  This case study 
illustrates the value of our framework in evaluating regulatory design options for the 
enforcement and compliance promotion function. 
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Introduction 
The law review literature has long-recognized that effective enforcement is an essential 
component of effective regulation.1  Yet much of the literature focuses on one aspect of the 
enforcement challenge or another.   For example, the underlying theory about optimal levels of 
enforcement has received considerable attention, 2 as have topics such as the relative merits of 
using deterrence-based versus cooperation-based approaches and the use of citizen suits.3 
                                                             
1 See, e.g., David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal 
Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) [hereinafter Markell, 
Deterrence-Based Enforcement]. 
2 See, e.g., Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 860-61 (2012); Michael Faure, 
Effectiveness of Environmental Law: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
293, 320-30 (2012); David A. Dana, The Perverse Incentives of Environmental Audit Immunity, 81 IOWA L. REV. 
969, 1004-06 (1998); Richard J. Pierce, Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory Treatment of 
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The purpose of this Article is to fill a gap in the law review literature by considering 
agencies’ enforcement and compliance promotion function holistically.  The Article approaches 
the challenge from an “inside-out” perspective,4 a perspective that administrative law scholars 
have found to be lacking in the academic literature.5    
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 563-64 (1986).  Each of these sources cites the seminal article on optimal 
deterrence, Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
3 See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616 (2013); Robert L. 
Glicksman & Dietrich H. Earnhart Depiction of the Regulator-Regulated Entity Relationship in the Chemical 
Industry:  Deterrence-Based v. Cooperative Enforcement, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 603 (2007); 
Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of 
Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93 (2005); Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory 
Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833 
(1985). 
We credit Professor Engstrom’s insightful and provocative recent article, which seeks to improve 
regulatory design in this realm, for motivating this effort.  Professor Engstrom focused on the rationalization of 
private and public enforcement litigation through agency gatekeeping options for private enforcement litigation, 
both conceptually and in the context of specific agencies such as EPA.  While we focus here on EPA, many of our 
points are generalizable beyond that agency.  We obviously bear responsibility for any missteps we may have made 
in attempting a reformulation and quite different elaboration than Engstrom’s of the central challenges of designing 
an apparatus that is responsive to current challenges facing the modern regulatory state in the enforcement realm.  
For insightful syntheses of economists’, political scientists’ and management theorists’  perspectives on regulatory 
design in addressing environmental challenges, see, e.g., Thomas P. Lyon, Environmental Governance: An 
Economic Perspective, in GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES 43 (Magali A. Delmas & Oran 
R. Young eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2009) [hereinafter GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT]; Maria Carmen 
Lemos & Arun Agrawal, Environmental Governance and Political Science, in GOVERNANCE FOR THE 
ENVIRONMENT, supra, at 69; Andrew King & Michael W. Toffel, Self-Regulatory Institutions for Solving 
Environmental Problems: Perspectives and Contributions from the Management Literature, in id. at 98.  The 
Canadian Auditor General has used a “plan-do-check-improve” model to evaluate management of Environment 
Canada’s enforcement program.  Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report of the Commissioner of the 
Environment and Sustainable Development, Enforcing the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, at 8 (Dec. 
2011) [hereinafter Auditor General Report], available at http://www.oag-
bvg.gc.ca/internet/english/parl_cesd_201112_03_e_36031.html.  
4 Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law 
Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 578, 597-603 (2011) (contrasting “inside-out” accountability, which they 
describe as “the potential of promoting . . . effective government from inside the bureaucracy. . .” and note has been 
a focus of public administration scholars, with administrative law scholarship, which has focused on “outside-in” 
accountability stemming from the administrative presidency, congressional oversight, and judicial review). 
5 Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the 
Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.  313, 319 (2013) (noting the prevalence of “recent calls for bringing an 
emphasis on inside-out legitimacy”); Shapiro & Wright, supra note 4, at 578 (noting that “[administrative law 
scholarship focuses almost exclusively” on controlling agency operations from outside of the agencies, and 
observing that, “with only a few exceptions . . . administrative law scholars treat agencies as a black box to be 
controlled from the outside, using political oversight and judicial review”).  Some legal scholars, of course, have 
paid close attention to the operation of discrete aspects of agency enforcement regimes.  See, e.g., JOEL A. MINTZ, 
ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES (revised edition) (University of Texas Press 2012); 
Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495 (1999) (discussing welfare-
maximizing strategies to create ideal governance); Robin Kundis Craig, Valuing the Public Health Aspects of 
Environmental Enforcement: Qualitative versus Quantitative Evaluations of Enforcement Effort, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
403 (2009) (urging greater reliance on quantitative metrics to drive agency enforcement choices).  The federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), among others, has engaged in numerous efforts over the years to develop, 
revisit, and improve upon agency approaches in the enforcement and compliance arena.  See, e.g., James M. Strock, 
EPA’s Environmental Enforcement in the 1990s, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. 10327 (August 1990); EPA, Enforcement Four-
Year Strategic Plan: Enhanced Environmental Enforcement for the 1990’s (Feb. 1991), available at 
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The Article begins by proposing a three-layered conceptual framework for considering 
options for structuring the administrative agency enforcement and compliance promotion 
function.  First, it identifies five components of effective regulation both generally and in the 
specific context of regulatory enforcement and compliance:  norm clarity, norm achievability, 
verifiability, an appropriate mix of sanctions and rewards, and indicia of legitimacy.6  Beyond 
examining the importance of these components in establishing and implementing enforcement 
and compliance promotion policies, we consider some of the complexities involved in fitting 
each component into particular regimes so that agencies may take advantage of opportunities to 
gain synergistic benefits and consider the need to make difficult trade-offs.  This assessment of 
how each component relates to the others is the second layer in the framework we propose.7    
The third layer of our framework for evaluating enforcement and compliance promotion 
functions relates to what we term “contextual design challenges.”8  One contextual design issue 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://yosemite.epa.gov/water/owrccatalog.nsf/9da204a4b4406ef885256ae0007a79c7/fbfb518793cd84c385256b060
0723741!OpenDocument.  EPA is in the midst of its latest initiative, which it calls Next Generation Compliance.  
See infra Part III.  Government interlocutors, scholars, and others have also weighed in on the structure of agency 
enforcement programs and continue to do so.  E.g., National Academy of Public Administration, Evaluating 
Environmental Progress: How EPA and the States Can Improve the Quality of Enforcement and Compliance 
Information (June 2001); U.S. GAO, Environmental Protection: More Consistency Needed Among EPA Regions in 
Approach to Enforcement (2000), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/rc00108.pdf; U.S. EPA Office of Inspector 
General, Consolidated Review of the Air Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Programs III (1997); U.S. EPA 
Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. GAO, EPA’s Effort to Improve and Make More Consistent its Compliance and 
Enforcement Activities (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-840T. 
We have also sought to advance thinking in this arena.  See CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. 
MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP  (2003); 
Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note 1; David Markell, EPA Enforcement: A Heightened Emphasis 
on Mitigation Relief, 45 TRENDS 13 (2014); Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Functional Government 
in 3-D: A Framework for Evaluating Allocations of Government Authority, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 19 (2014). 
6 See infra Part IA.  As with virtually all categorization efforts, ours is contestable, and alternative characterizations 
are possible.  See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Principles of Environmental Enforcement I-5 (Feb. 1992) (listing as important 
components of an effective enforcement program factors such as: 1) establishing enforceable requirements; 2) 
identifying regulated parties; 3) setting priorities; 4) promoting compliance; 5) monitoring compliance; 6) 
responding to violations; 7) clarifying roles and responsibilities; and 8) evaluating performance) [hereinafter EPA, 
Environmental Enforcement]; Paul B. Smyth and Milo C. Mason, Making Tough Choices Easier: Compliance and 
Enforcement 102, 3-SPG NATURAL RESOURCES & ENV’T 3 (2004); Douglas M. Costle, Environmental Regulation 
and Regulatory Reform, 57 WASH. L. REV. 409, 423 (1982) (former EPA Administrator listing as characteristics of 
effective regulation clarity and certainty, reasonableness and fairness, and efficiency and cost-effectiveness); 
Meredith James, Results-Based Environmental Regulation in Canada: Creative Solution or Re-Branding 
Regulation?, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 139, 143 (2009) (identifying effectiveness and efficiency as the usual focus of 
debates about tool selection and including as characteristics of effective regulation “clear, measurable, enforceable 
standards and mandatory language”).  Cf. Dr. Paul Harpur, New Governance and the Role of Public and Private 
Monitoring of Labor Conditions: Sweatshops and China Social Compliance for Textile and Apparel Industry, 38 
RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 1 (2010-2011) (“Effective regulation has three essential components.  First, the law must 
develop standards; second, there must be sufficient monitoring of compliance to detect non-compliance; and third, 
there must be some form of motivation to avoid non-compliance.”) (citing STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS 
REFORM 5 (1982)); Report of the Committee on Ethics, 15 ENERGY L.J. 193, 195 (1994) (listing as components of 
effective ethics regulation moral resonance, clarity of purposes, non-triviality, practicality, equity, and 
proportionality). 
7 See infra Part 1B. 
8 See infra Part IC.  The purpose of identifying these challenges is to provide an organizing structure for comparing 
the merits of alternative ways to design administrative programs such as enforcement and compliance inducement 
programs.  For alternative conceptualizations, see, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the 
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relates to the hybrid character of contemporary governance efforts; as the “new governance” and 
other literatures reflect,9 governance is no longer the exclusive province of the government, if it 
ever was, and those seeking to design effective regulation should consider the multiplicity of 
actors.10  The capacity of each actor to affect compliance is relevant to the desirability of 
alternative options for the structuring of enforcement and compliance programs.  A second 
challenge is the importance of confronting past performance as well as future challenges and 
opportunities.  Past failures to consider performance of wide swaths of the regulated community, 
for example, counsel in favor of considering changes to enforcement regimes to account for at 
least the more significant outliers.11  A third design issue stems from the dynamic character of 
governance challenges.  As the regulatory treatment of the environmental issues posed by 
climate change reflects, normative objectives are likely to be dynamic in some cases.12  The 
nature of the tools available to government and other key stakeholders also may shift because of 
factors such as technological advances and changes in resource availability.  A sharp reduction in 
government enforcement resources, for example, might suggest the need to facilitate private 
enforcement.  It is essential to consider these dynamic aspects of the regulatory landscape in 
structuring enforcement and compliance efforts.  Finally, the salience of possible design changes, 
and the need to prioritize design improvements, is a fourth critical contextual design challenge.  
Resource limitations, for example, limit government enforcement and compliance promotion 
capacity, requiring policymakers to decide which efforts are the most critical.13  
The Article also tests our conceptual framework by including a case study of an ongoing 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) effort to reinvent its enforcement and compliance 
promotion program and by applying our framework to EPA’s initiative. 14  This case study 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (providing a framework for a 
governance model which includes “increased participation of nonstate actors, stakeholder collaboration, diversity 
and competition, decentralization and subsidiarity, integration of policy domains, flexibility and noncoerciveness, 
adaptability and dynamic learning, and legal orchestration among proliferated norm-generating entities”). 
9 See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 8, at 466-70 (describing the goals of new governance as “economic efficiency, political 
legitimacy, and social democracy”); Neil Gunningham, The New Collaborative Environmental Governance: The 
Localization of Regulation, 36 J. L. & SOC’Y 145, 146-150 (2009) (discussing the characteristics of new governance 
in an environmental context).  
10 E.g., Engstrom, supra note 3 (focusing on rationalization of private and public enforcement litigation as part of 
the effort to improve regulatory design). 
11 EPA is attempting such an assessment in its reinvention effort, as we discuss in more detail in Part III, infra. 
12 See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 1 (2014); Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead” – Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for 
Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 17, 66-67 (2010) J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the 
Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (2008). 
13 EPA appears to be at risk of experiencing such reductions.  See infra Part II; Sean Reilly, EPA sees reductions in 
enforcement, inspections through 2018, FEDERALTIMES (Feb. 21, 2014), available at 
http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20140221/MGMT05/302240003/EPA-sees-reductions-enforcement-
inspections-through-2018. 
14 See infra Part III.  This article offers what we hope is a constructive contribution to the debate about whether legal 
scholarship is (in)sufficiently tethered to the real world.  It attempts to evaluate the real world practicability of our 
conception of the manner in which the regulatory state operates in light of an agency’s actual practices and 
procedures.  For differing views about the value of legal scholarship in terms of the resolution of real-world 
challenges, see, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 36 (1992) (endorsing scholarship that reflects “a healthy balance of theory and 
doctrine”); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Engaged Scholarship as Method and Vocation, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 193, 
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illustrates the potential value of our framework in evaluating regulatory design options for the 
enforcement and compliance promotion function.  
Part I of the Article lays out our conceptual framework.  It first identifies and examines 
why each of the five components of effective regulation we have identified is important in 
establishing and implementing enforcement and compliance promotion policies.  Next, Part I 
explains why it is important in thinking about the structure and content of an enforcement and 
compliance program to consider these five components holistically; it is, in our view, of 
foundational importance to consider how the structure and operation of each of the components 
influences the others.  The third section of Part I introduces the third layer of our multi-layered 
conceptual framework, which is comprised of four contextual design challenges that we believe 
may significantly influence how one should approach design and implementation of an effective 
enforcement and compliance promotion regime.   
Part II contextualizes how an agency might begin to consider the design of its 
enforcement and compliance regime by focusing on one agency’s (EPA’s) track record.  This 
Part examines two features of past performance that are of particular importance (the adequacy 
of agency resources and the nature of the regulated community) and the implications of changes 
in each feature for the future operation of enforcement and compliance programs.  This Part 
helps to ground the paper by offering our perspective on EPA’s past enforcement performance 
and some significant challenges and opportunities the agency faces.      
Part III is an initial attempt to give our framework a test run.  It provides an overview of 
an ongoing EPA initiative to re-invent its promotion of compliance with the Clean Water Act 
(CWA)’s regulatory requirements.  In this Part, we consider EPA’s ongoing reinvention effort in 
light of the conceptual framework we have introduced (in Part I) and EPA’s track record and 
anticipated challenges and opportunities (discussed in Part II).  In doing so, we explain how the 
application of our framework would enrich EPA’s analysis of available options for restructuring 
its CWA compliance promotion program.  In addition to providing insights on EPA’s program, 
we hope our work fuels analysis of the design and implementation of other regulatory programs 
and, relatedly, demonstrates how the context in which a particular program operates is likely to 
affect the manner in which the regulatory components we have identified can contribute to (or 
detract from) effective regulation.15 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
204 (2010) (urging scholarship that “is both grounded and theoretical, actively involved in the world of its subject 
matter, and for that reason, able to think about it in fresh ways”). 
We are most familiar with EPA and hence have focused on regulatory design issues based on that agency’s 
compliance promotion strategies.  Regulatory design is likely to be highly dependent on context, but insights from 
EPA’s enforcement program are likely to be particularly valuable more broadly for various reasons, including the 
agency’s extensive experience, accumulated over more than forty years under different pollution control statutes, in 
fostering compliance; the challenges posed by the participation of the states in pollution control regimes, which raise 
federalism issues similar to those facing other agencies; and the evolution of the capacities of regulatory 
stakeholders and of the challenges confronting them over time.  See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of 
Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1145 (2012) (discussing a “unified 
approach to the design of private enforcement mechanisms better tailored to the exigencies of particular regulatory 
regimes”).   
15 For one example of the type of case study that deserves close attention for its insights about enforcement and 
compliance programs, see e.g., Joe Schieffelin, et al., Colorado’s Hazardous Waste Small Quantity Generator (SQG) 
Self-Certification Program (April 2013) (on file with the authors).  NEXT GENERATION COMPLIANCE (LeRoy C. 
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I. Effective Regulation:  Key Components and Contextual Design Challenges  
In fashioning or refashioning the design of a regulatory program, policymakers strive, 
among other things, to create mechanisms that are effective in achieving, or at least advancing, 
the program’s goals.16  The relative attractiveness of options available to an agency like EPA in 
structuring and implementing its enforcement and compliance promotion function may depend 
on the nature of the regulatory program.  Numerous models of regulation, and hence effective 
regulation, exist.  For example, in the environmental field, many commentators characterize 
traditional regulation as “command-and-control.”  According to Professors Cole and Grossman, 
“’[c]ommand-and-control’ is in essence a regulatory approach whereby the government 
‘commands’ pollution reductions (e.g., by setting emissions standards) and ‘controls’ how these 
reductions are achieved (e.g., through the installation of specific pollution-control 
technologies).”17  Other variations include market-based approaches to regulation,18 “new 
governance” approaches,19 and adaptive regulation.20  Each type of regulation has different 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Paddock & Jessica A. Wentz, eds., Envtl Law Inst., 2014) [hereinafter NEXT GENERATION COMPLIANCE], collects 
descriptions and assessments of recent innovative federal and state environmental regulatory enforcement and 
compliance programs. 
16 Agency “pathologies” and other factors obviously have the potential to affect policymakers’ motivations.  See 
Engstrom, supra note 3, at 663-64 (discussing “bureaucratic behavioral pathologies,” such as agency capture, 
agency self-aggrandizement, agencies’ predilections for overly cautious behavior, and the influence of careerist 
incentives of agency personnel, in framing choices among different agency gatekeeping options.)  Although there is 
debate about the effectiveness of our nation’s environmental initiatives, it is well accepted both that there have been 
some successes and that much more remains to be done.  See, e.g., Robert Adler, Resilience, Restoration, and 
Sustainability: Revisiting the Fundamental Principles of the Clean Water Act, 32 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 139, 172 
(2010) ( noting that “the [CWA] has resulted in significant progress in improving the quality of the Nation’s 
waters”) 
17 Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the 
Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887, 
887 n.1 (1999).  This definition is misleading for federal environmental mandates that establish performance 
standards, which dictate the end result regulated entities must achieve (e.g., a certain level of pollution reduction that 
a regulator determines is achievable using available technology), but not the means of achieving those results. 
Regulated entities have at least some discretion to select the means.  Programs that dictate both the ends and the 
means are referred to as design standards, which are much rarer than performance standards in federal pollution 
control law.  See, e.g., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A 
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 151-52 (2003); Office of Technology Assessment, Environmental Policy Tools: A User's 
Guide, OTA-ENV-634 (1995).  As others have pointed out, the term command-and-control is a pejorative term 
whose use arose out an effort by regulated businesses to depict environmental regulation as the product of 
“overregulation, big government, and bureaucratic zealotry.”  Richard N.L. Andrews, The EPA at 40: An Historical 
Perspective, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 223, 234-35 (2011).  See also David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The 
Missing Instrument: Dirty Input Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 76 (2009) (substituting the term “traditional 
regulation” for “command-and-control regulation” “[t]o avoid confusion and misleading pejorative terminology”).  
As Cole and Grossman point out, critics of traditional regulation have even equated command-and-control 
regulation “with ‘Soviet-style’ regulation and ‘socialist central planning,’ implying that it is both endemically 
inefficient and democratically illegitimate.”  Cole & Grossman, supra, at 887. 
18 E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651 to 7651o (emissions trading program to reduce acid rain). 
19 E.g., Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New Governance and Industry Culture, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2515 (2013); 
Jason M. Solomon, New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory 
Law and Practice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 227; Douglas Nejaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323 
(2009); Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV. 498 (2004). 
20 E.g., Craig & Ruhl, supra note 12 (discussing three models of regulation, traditional, market-based, and adaptive).  
The list in the text of available models of environmental regulation is not exhaustive.  For a succinct review of 
several types of regulation, see Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 17. 
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features, and requires different things to work well for it to be effective.21  Agencies like EPA 
may use different types of regulation for different challenges, and they may mix and match 
different approaches to address concerns as well.22   
For many types of regulation, enforcement (and compliance with regulatory norms more 
generally) is often characterized as essential to effective regulation,23 although it is not sufficient 
to achieve desired environmental protection policy objectives.24  While recognizing that the 
particular regulatory approach may affect the choice of enforcement and compliance promotion 
strategies, at a macro level we suggest that it is possible to identify at least five critical 
components of an effective regulatory enforcement and compliance function.  Section A below 
introduces and reviews these components.  Section B considers some of the complexities 
involved in fitting each of these components into particular regimes, including the synergies they 
provide and the need to make difficult trade-offs when they threaten to work at cross-purposes.  
Section C then introduces four challenges that further contextualize the task of designing the 
appropriate structure and content of an agency’s enforcement and compliance promotion 
function.   
A. Five Key Components of Effective Regulation 
Although it is possible to describe the components of effective regulation in many 
ways,25 we think at least five features are relevant to the design of a successful regulatory 
enforcement and compliance program:  norm clarity, norm achievability, compliance 
                                                             
21 See, e.g., Sally S. Simpson et al., An Empirical Assessment of Corporate Environmental Crime-Control Strategies, 
101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 231, 237-38 (2013) (describing different features of command-and-control and 
self-regulation); Craig & Ruhl, supra note 12, at 20-21 (suggesting that the type of regulation used may affect the 
salience of its attributes).  Definitions of “effectiveness” vary based not only on the tools or strategies to be used in a 
particular regulatory scheme, but also on regulatory goals. 
22 For example, under the CWA, EPA uses all of the types of regulation discussed in the text to restrict 
discharges of pollutants.   
23 Congress, regulators, and scholars have all subscribed to this view.  See, e.g., EPA, Environmental Enforcement, 
supra note 6, at 1 (“Without compliance, environmental requirements will not achieve the desired results.”); Auditor 
General Report, supra note _ (noting that the Canadian counterpart to EPA, Environment Canada, similarly has 
concluded that “environmental laws alone are not enough to guarantee a cleaner, better environment.  These laws 
also need to be enforced.”); Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note 1.  See also Barton H. Thompson, 
Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 189 (“Strong environmental laws 
are meaningless unless they are effectively enforced.”); Thomas O. McGarity, When Strong Enforcement Works 
Better than Weak Regulation: The EPA/DOJ New Source Review Enforcement Initiative, 72 MD. L. REV. 1204, 1206 
(2013) (describing “what can be accomplished when a regulatory agency and [the Department of Justice] are willing 
to devote substantial resources to a coordinated deterrence-based enforcement initiative”).   
Some “regulatory” design approaches may not include an enforcement component at all or it may be quite 
remote or understated, such as EPA’s 33/50 strategy.  For descriptions of that program, see U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, 33/50 Program: The Final Record, EPA-745-R-99-
004 (March 1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/3350/3350-fnl.pdf; Madhu Khanna & Lisa A. Damon, 
EPA's Voluntary 33/50 Program: Impact on Toxic Release and Economic Performance of Firms, 37 J. ENVTL. 
ECON. & MGMT. 1 (1999). 
24 See Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance, 30 ENVTL. F. 22, 23 (2013) (noting that “[w]hile enforcement is 
an essential part of EPA’s compliance program, it is not realistic to think that enforcement alone will get us to the 
levels of compliance envisioned by our rules”). 
25 See supra note 6.  
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verifiability, an appropriate mix of sanctions and rewards, and indicia of legitimacy, as we 
illustrate in Table 1.26   
Table 1 – Components of Effective Regulation  
Norm Clarity  
Norm Achievability 
Verifiability 
The Mix of Rewards and Sanctions 
Indicia of Legitimacy 
 
1.  Clarity 
It is axiomatic that it is important to consider the clarity of regulatory norms in designing 
effective regulations.27  There are good reasons for regulators to strive for clarity and certainty 
and to create clear expectations for acceptable (and unacceptable) conduct.  It is difficult for a 
regulated entity to comply with its regulatory responsibilities, or for others to assess whether it 
has done so, without understanding what those responsibilities are.  Participants across the 
spectrum of interested stakeholders recognize the value of establishing clear standards for 
regulated parties to meet.  Complaints about indeterminacy are heard from regulated parties as 
well as members of the public.28  The government has internalized this message as well, with the 
head of EPA’s enforcement office recently acknowledging that “we should focus on greater 
simplicity and clarity [in our regulations].  One of the principles we have learned over years of 
                                                             
26 One could easily compartmentalize the features of the regulatory process differently, even if one were to agree 
with the thrust of our effort.  For example, our first two categories overlap to some degree, though we think they are 
sufficiently distinct to deserve separate treatment.  Similarly, one could separate the carrot and stick-oriented 
approaches to promoting compliance, which we have combined in our fourth component.  Additionally, we have not 
created a separate element to acknowledge the options for self-regulation that play an increasingly important role.  
Some might break out fairness as a separate component of effective regulation.  We think perceptions of fairness (or 
lack thereof) in terms of the distributional effects of regulation affect regulatory legitimacy, and we therefore treat 
fairness as an aspect of legitimacy.  Finally, achieving desired results is obviously one of the indicia of effectiveness.  
Our typology is intended to provide a big picture sense of different key components of an effective regulatory 
process.  We believe our framework for integrating the contextual challenges discussed in Part IC into the design of 
enforcement and compliance programs would remain valuable even if one were to define the key components of 
effective regulation differently than we have. 
27 See, e.g., Auditor General Report, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that a “range of activities contributes to compliance . . 
. , including drafting regulations that are enforceable . . .” and further noting that “enforceability” “depends on a 
number of factors, including clear language and definitions . . .”). 
28 At the far end of the continuum are cases such as General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1333-34 (D.C. Cir. 
1995), in which the D.C. Circuit rejected an EPA enforcement action because EPA’s rules did not provide 
sufficiently clear norms.  Probably more typically, lack of clarity leads to delays and increases in transaction costs, 
and may discourage socially worthwhile activity.  See Angela Morrison Uhland, Improving Regulations for 
Biomass-Based Electrical Generating Facilities, 23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 15 (2008).  The more likely the 
possible enforcement, and the more burdensome any sanctions assessed would be, the more likely indeterminacy 
will have these effects. 
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hard experience is that compliance is better when the rules are simple and clear.”29  This message 
is most obviously salient for the development of regulations,30 but it is also important in the 
development of guidance and the exercise of enforcement discretion.31 
Achieving or pursuing clarity requires attention during multiple stages of the regulatory 
process.  An obvious starting point is the regulatory norms themselves.  A second important 
aspect of clarity, however, involves education, especially education of the regulated community.  
Studies have shown that taking the extra effort to educate regulated parties about their legal 
obligations can pay significant dividends in terms of improved compliance.  A recent Colorado 
compliance initiative involving hazardous waste rules, for example, found that an innovative 
state effort to increase understanding of regulatory requirements led to significant improvements 
in compliance, thereby dramatically reducing the need for enforcement.32   
Clarity, however, also may come at a cost.  Statutory and regulatory schemes often cover 
a large number of actors, and not all are situated similarly.  Thus, choices often need to be made 
about whether to use one-size-fits-all approaches or, alternatively, to tailor treatment of different 
sub-groups within the regulated community.   In some situations it is possible to use fairly bright 
lines for such tailoring.  RCRA’s use of thresholds to distinguish between standard generators 
and de minimis generators is an example.33  Sometimes, however, efforts to regulate “fairly” 
                                                             
29 Giles, supra note 24, at 24.  See also Water Quality Standards Regulatory Clarifications, 78 Fed. Reg. 54,517, 
54,521 (proposed Sept. 4, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131) (highlighting the value of “clear regulatory 
requirements” and transparency in promoting water quality protection).  Certainty can also help the government 
perform its responsibilities more efficiently and effectively.  See, e.g., EPA OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, CLEAN WATER ACT ACTION PLAN at 4 (2009) [hereinafter, EPA, CWAP] (noting that 
EPA’s challenges in protecting water quality have been increased by judicial decisions concerning the scope of the 
CWA’s coverage because the “confusion and uncertainty” they created “have negatively impacted EPA’s ability to 
enforce by significantly increasing the amount of time and resources it takes to bring enforcement actions”).  
Professor Craig, addressing this uncertainty, argues that “[l]egal clarity, certainty, and uniformity are recognized 
rule-of-law values, particularly when the law seeks to regulate private conduct.”  Robin Kundis Craig, Agencies 
Interpreting Courts Interpreting Statutes: The Deference Conundrum of a Divided Supreme Court, 61 EMORY L.J. 1, 
5 (2011). 
30 See, e.g., Vincent Di Lorenzo, Principles-Based Regulation and Legislative Congruence, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 45, 89 (2012) (citing research that “demonstrates that certainty in statutory or regulatory mandates 
increases the likelihood of compliance”). 
31 For an interesting case study, see Melissa K. Scanlan & Stephanie Tai, Marginalized Monitoring: Adaptively 
Managing Urban Stormwater, 31 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2013).  See also Elizabeth Glass Geltman & 
Andrew E. Skroback, Reinventing the EPA to Conform with the New American Environmentality, 23 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 1, 53 (1998) (urging creation of a “no action” process in which EPA would provide facility-specific 
guidance “so that it gives industry a higher degree of certainty than the EPA’s existing guidance documents and 
policy letters”); Joan H. Krause, Fraud in Universal Coverage: The Usual Suspects (and Then Some), 55 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 1151, 1156 (2007) (arguing that greater clarity in regulatory guidance may be more effective than higher 
penalties in reducing undesirable activities concerning health care insurance); cf. Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering 
Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy Storage, 41 F.S.U. L. REV. ___, ___ (forthcoming 2014) 
(arguing that “not all uncertainty is created equal”), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2294056.  
32 Schieffelin, et al., supra note 15; U.S., EPA Increasing Understanding of Environmental Requirements is the 
Heart of EPA Assistance (2008), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/assistance/08cafactsheet.pdf  (describing successful education 
programs which reduced emissions from paint stripping and coating operations and partnerships between EPA and 
states to increase understanding of industry best waste management practices); U.S. EPA, The National Nitrate 
Compliance Initiative (2002) (describing a compliance assistance initiative involving the metal finishing sector).  
33 40 C.F.R. § 261.5 (describing conditional exemption for small quantity waste generators).    
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require much more ad hoc judgments about whether particular members of the regulated 
community qualify for special treatment.  Especially in the latter situations, where there are no 
bright line rules or tests, there is a clear tension between clarity and “fair” treatment.34 
Regardless of the precise weight policy makers and others attach to clarity as a 
component of effective regulation in a particular context, it seems relatively uncontested that 
clarity of norms and expectations is a factor that at a minimum deserves attention in regulatory 
design.35  
 2.  Achievability 
A second key component of effective regulation is implementability or achievability of 
requirements.  Using EPA’s terminology, achievability involves the extent to which strategies 
“will work in the real world – rules with compliance built in.”36  A recent example of EPA’s 
emphasis on achievability in developing a particular regulatory regime relates to the agency’s 
proposal of emission control regulations for oil and gas producers under the Clean Air Act 
(CAA).  EPA adopted the strategy of allowing producers simply to inform EPA that they are 
using air pollution control equipment that EPA has certified rather than testing the equipment 
themselves.  EPA explained that its purpose in using this approach was to “make compliance 
easier and less costly, while improving results . . . .”37   
Achievability has not always trumped other values in policy design.  Congress has 
insisted that regulatory standards be set with little if any attention given to achievability because 
of the weight it attached to other values, such as attaining a particular level of health or 
environmental protection.   In the environmental laws, for example, Congress in some cases has 
directed EPA not to consider costs in developing regulatory standards.38   In other regulatory 
schemes, Congress did not prohibit consideration of cost, but nevertheless made it clear that it 
was permissible for EPA to attach relatively little weight to it, and apply a relatively loose 
definition of achievability.39  At least in some contexts, technology-forcing regulatory 
                                                             
34 Some of the waiver provisions under the CWA are examples of regulation that require ad hoc judgments.  On the 
potential benefits of making case-by-case adjustments to regulations after adoption, including through the 
enforcement process, see Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regulation through Incremental 
Adjustment, 52 KAN. L. REV. 1179 (2004). 
35 The rule of lenity is a canon of construction that highlights the value courts have attached to clarity, 
particularly in criminal prosecutions.  See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).  See also Arizona v. 
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988) (highlighting the benefits of a bright line rule which provides “clear and 
unequivocal guidelines to the law enforcement profession”). 
36 Giles, supra note 24, at 23.  For arguments in favor of pragmatic regulatory approaches, see SHAPIRO & 
GLICKSMAN, supra note 17.  There is obviously an overlap between this second attribute and certainty in that clear 
rules may be easier to achieve than unclear ones. 
37 Giles, supra note 24, at 23.  We do not mean to suggest that self-reporting without agency oversight would 
necessarily be appropriate.  See, e.g., Schieffelin et al., supra note 15 (noting that self-reporting in tandem with 
agency oversight helped to improve compliance). 
38 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (holding that the CAA prohibits EPA from 
considering cost in setting national ambient air quality standards).   
39 E.g., Ass’n of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 808-09 (9th Cir. 1980) (acknowledging that Congress 
adopted stringent technology-based regulations that might put some regulated sources out of business); Union Elec. 
Co v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 260 (1976) (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 2-3 (1970)) (“Therefore, the Committee 
determined that existing sources of [air] pollutants either should meet the standard of the law or be closed down.”).  
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approaches have been used successfully to substantially improve normatively-desired outcomes 
notwithstanding questions at the outset about the achievability of such approaches.40   
Beyond the scope of any particular regime, scholars have debated the value of including 
hortatory language in environmental statutes because of the gap between objectives and likely 
results.  Some suggest that setting the bar high has had a positive influence on performance.41  
Others have been more skeptical.42  Regardless of the weight that should be attached to 
achievability in the design of any particular regulatory regime, the larger, conceptual point is that 
it is important to consider the extent to which regulated parties are likely to be able to achieve 
regulatory standards in development of regulatory approaches.   
3. Verifiability  
 A third key component of effective regulation and of strategies to induce compliance 
involves what we term “verifiability.”  We define verifiability as the capacity to monitor 
compliance with regulatory requirements.  There is little question that the ability to monitor 
compliance with legal requirements is a critical component of effective regulation.43 
The major federal environmental regulatory statutes generally provide broad monitoring 
authority that includes, at a minimum, authority for the government to inspect an operation’s 
                                                             
40 Technology-forcing regulation has long been an accepted and important tool for achieving environmental goals.  
Aspirational regulations have prompted technological developments that facilitated improved performance, 
sometimes in the face of infeasibility claims.  See Thomas O. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in 
Environmental Regulation, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943 (1994); Robert L. Glicksman, Anatomy of Industry Resistance 
to Climate Change: A Familiar Litany, in ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (David M. 
Driesen ed., The MIT Press 2010); Daniel P. Selmi, Impacts of Air Quality Regulation on Economic Development, 
13-Fall NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 382, 386 (1998) (“In the past, claims that the pollution control technology is 
impossible to achieve have collapsed when one manufacturer announced that it was able to comply.”). 
41 See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment, Culpability, and 
Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 150 (2004) (noting that many environmental laws with 
aspirational objectives “have arguably forced much beneficial technological and social change”). 
42 Compare John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 300 (1990) (“Symbolic 
legislation is not a set of specific instructions for the agency to follow, but a statement of legislative aspirations and 
assurances delivered to various constituencies as well as the agency.”); Lincoln L. Davies, Reconciling Renewable 
Portfolio Standards and Feed-in Tariffs, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 326-27 (2012) (raising possibility that 
renewable portfolio standards have operated as “political subterfuges: symbolic legislation adopted to garner 
electoral favor but intended to accomplish very little in actuality”); Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic 
Legislation: Perceptions and Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L. REV. 413, 446-58 (1999), with 
Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Defending Overstatement: The Symbolic Clean Air Act and Carbon Dioxide, 30 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 99, 119 (2006) (noting the instrumental value of symbolic legislation, which can “function as a 
‘thumb on the scale’ in favor of more rather than less pollution control.  [Such] symbolism, though imperfect, is a 
rational legislative approach to states’ and industries' persistent resistance to cleaning the air.”). 
43 See, e.g., Auditor General Report, supra note 1, at 9-10; U.S. EPA, Office of Inspector General, The EPA Should 
Improve Monitoring of Controls in the Renewable Fuel Standard Program 6 (2013), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2013/20130905-13-P-0373.pdf (recommending additional monitoring to verify that 
participants comply with regulations and to avoid fraud cases); U.S. EPA, Office of Inspector General, EPA Needs 
to Direct More Attention, Efforts, and Funding to Enhance its Speciation Monitoring Program for Measuring Fine 
Particulate Matter, 3 (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2005/20050207-2005-P-00004.pdf 
(describing the EPA’s speciation monitoring network as a “critical component” for developing control strategies); 
U.S. GAO, Environmental Enforcement: EPA Cannot Ensure the Accuracy of Self-Reported Compliance 
Monitoring Data 15 (1993), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/RCED-93-21 (describing an initiative to 
identify hazardous waste programs operating without self-reporting as vital to the integrity of the regulatory system).  
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compliance with regulatory requirements as well as an obligation for the regulated party to 
monitor its own performance.44  Yet, monitoring schemes come in various shapes and sizes.45  
One of us was involved many years ago in establishing a statewide strategy that sought to 
enhance verifiability by requiring facilities with especially significant compliance concerns to 
hire independent third-party monitors whose role was to complement both government 
inspection efforts and the facility’s own compliance efforts.46 
As a practical matter the nature and extent of monitoring that occurs is likely to depend 
on a variety of features of the particular regulatory regime involved, including the availability of 
government resources; the complexity associated with monitoring compliance and the training 
required to monitor credibly; the availability, cost, and reliability of monitoring equipment; the 
trustworthiness of regulated parties and their commitment to self-monitoring; and the capacity of 
non-governmental interests to participate in monitoring.   
Some commentators have highlighted the importance of broader transparency to the 
public as an aspect of verifiability.47  Transparency can be enhanced in a variety of ways.  For 
example, the Clean Water Act requires permittees to submit discharge monitoring reports 
(DMRs) that demonstrate (non-)compliance with legal requirements and requires that these 
DMRs be easily accessible to interested citizens.  The transparency of the CWA in revealing 
non-compliance is a principal reason most of the citizen suit activity against alleged violators of 
the major environmental laws has occurred under that statute.48  Other reporting requirements, 
                                                             
44 E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (CWA); 42 U.S.C. §  6927 (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)); 42 U.S.C.  
§  7414 (CAA). 
45 Monitoring can take several forms, such as the requirement that regulated entities file periodic discharge 
monitoring reports (DMRs), as under the CWA, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2 (defining DMRs), 122.41(l)(4)(i), or the 
obligation for industrial facilities to report annual chemical releases under the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act.  See U.S. EPA, Toxic Release Inventory Program, available at http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-
release-inventory-tri-program.  DMRs are compliance-based, while chemical release forms are not strictly so but can 
indirectly assist environmental performance generally and compliance in particular.  Verifiability tools vary in their 
degree of transparency. 
46 See David L. Markell, States and Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to Our “Laboratories of Democracy” in 
the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 408 (1994).  Other 
approaches include reward systems, U.S. EPA, Performance Track Program Guide 2 (Sept. 2005); compliance 
incentives, U.S. EPA, Operating Principles for an Integrated Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Program 8 
(Interim Final Nov. 18, 1996); and spotlighting and information dissemination, Cass Sunstein, Informational 
Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA L. REV. 613, 616 (1999).    
47 See David L. Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and its Implications for Governance: The Issue of 
Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (2005) [hereinafter Markell, Slack] (discussing increases in transparency and 
public involvement).  EPA’s view is that “[p]ublic disclosure is [an] underutilized tool:  there is powerful evidence 
that publishing information about company performance drives better behavior, as pressure is applied by customers, 
neighbors, investors, and insurers.”  Giles, supra note 24, at 24.  Further, Giles indicates that transparency may serve 
a “reminder function” by drawing attention to problems and inducing senior-level officials to fix them.  Id.  
Transparency also may bring community pressure to bear on lower performing parties and alert investors and 
insurers in ways that provide financial motivation to improve performance.   Id. at 25-26. 
48 See, e.g., James R. May, Now More than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 
1, 2 (2003) (noting that most environmental citizen suits between 1978 and 1983 were filed under the CWA, 
although suits were distributed more evenly in later years); William L. Andreen, Motivating Enforcement: 
Institutional Culture and the Clean Water Act, 24 PACE ENVT L. REV. 67, 75 (2007) [hereinafter Andreen, 
Motivating Enforcement] (reporting that environmental NGOs brought hundreds of CWA cases during the Reagan 
administration when federal enforcement flagged). 
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such as those for hazardous substance releases above a reportable quantity,49 or pursuant to 
EPA’s toxics release inventory (TRI) program,50 are useful for monitoring and verifying 
compliance with legal requirements while also serving other purposes.51 
Considerable evidence shows that in many circumstances inadequate verification 
contributes to lower-than-desired levels of compliance with environmental requirements.  To 
offer an example from the sphere of international environmental law, the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism has suffered from weak verifiability, which has undermined the 
effectiveness of the Mechanism.52  The Canadian Auditor General similarly found that 
monitoring shortcomings weakened the enforcement and compliance performance of a Canadian 
environmental program.53  On the other hand, enhanced reporting has led to dramatically 
improved compliance in some cases.  In a recent article, EPA’s Assistant Administrator for 
Enforcement highlighted a 2008 study in Massachusetts that found that drinking water systems 
required to mail compliance information to customers reduced both violations and severe health 
violations significantly as a result.54  She noted that “EPA’s efforts to make our data more 
available are only starting to scratch the surface of the ways transparency can improve results.”55   
 In short, while the optimal parameters for incorporating a verification component into a 
particular regulatory regime will depend on a wide variety of factors, the literature demonstrates 
that verification is a foundational element of an effective regulatory scheme.  
4.  The Mix of Rewards and Sanctions  
A fourth component of an effective regulatory scheme is its capacity to incentivize 
regulated parties to comply with regulatory obligations through the use of both carrots and sticks.  
Not every violation is worth pursuing, even in a world free of resource constraints.  
Conceptually, an optimal level of compliance maximizes net social benefits.56   
                                                             
49 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (reporting requirement under CERCLA). 
50 42 U.S.C. § 11023. 
51 David L. Markell, The Federal Superfund Program: Proposals for Strengthening the Federal/State Relationship, 
18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 1, 82 (1993) (citing Charles L. Elkins, Toxic Chemicals, the Right Response, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 13, 1988, at F3) (stating that the TRI program revealed the extent which companies were discharging 
potentially harmful substances in both accidents and routine daily operations). 
52 See, e.g., Alan Ramo, The California Offset Game: Who Wins and Who Loses?, 20 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 109, 121 (2014) (“The CDM has suffered serious [verifiability] problems.  Determining whether 
emissions have actually increased is easy if you have continuous and automatic emissions monitoring that can be 
verified.  In a developing country where one relies upon records that may not exist, and testing technology that may 
be inadequate or fraudulent, it can be difficult if not impossible.”). 
53 Auditor General Report, supra note 3, at 2. 
54 Giles, supra note 24, at 24 
55 Id. at 25-26. 
56 See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental 
Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 297, 316 (1999); Engstrom, supra note 3, at 630 (citing Becker, supra note 2, at 200, 
as the source of “the classic account of optimal deterrence in which sanctions are set equal to the net social cost of 
undesirable conduct divided by the probability of successful prosecution, such that a wrongdoer internalizes the full 
social cost of her action”). 
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EPA, on its own and in tandem with environmental or community NGOs and regulated 
parties, has a rich array of options.57  These include litigation options such as criminal 
prosecutions under many of the environmental statutes, civil judicial actions, and administrative 
enforcement actions, some of which may, like their judicial counterparts, seek penalties and 
other relief.58  Beyond these types of formal enforcement litigation, EPA uses strategies that 
employ “carrots” or a mix of “carrots and sticks” to promote compliance.59  An active debate 
continues about the relative effectiveness of different strategies in different contexts.60 
At the ground level, EPA has developed a library full of enforcement response and 
penalty policies that seek to prioritize violations that warrant different levels of enforcement 
attention. 61  The agency has generally attempted to focus on “significant violations” and “high 
priority” violations and give less or different types of attention to minor instances of non-
compliance.62  It has also developed a substantial set of compliance promotion and incentive 
policies that reflect a mix of strategies.63   
                                                             
57 Jon D. Silberman, Does Environmental Deterrence Work? Evidence and Experience Say Yes, But We Need to 
Understand How and Why, in MAKING LAW WORK: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE & SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
384  (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds, 2005) [hereinafter MAKING LAW WORK] (describing actions EPA can use, 
including civil and criminal enforcement, penalties, injunctive relief, public notification of violations, and varying 
incentives).  Following up to assess whether alleged violators return to compliance is another aspect of enforcement.   
Auditor General Report, supra note 3, at 2. 
58 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (CWA); 42 U.S.C. 6928 (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (CAA). 
59 See Lyon, supra note 3, at 49-52 (discussing the impacts of alternative policy instruments, such as subsidies and 
effluent fees); Robert Esworthy, Federal Pollution Control Laws: How Are They Enforced?, Congressional 
Research Service Report 19 (June 18, 2013), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34384.pdf 
[hereinafter Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?] (noting that EPA uses a diverse set of strategies to promote 
compliance, including compliance assistance, administrative and civil enforcement, and criminal enforcement); 
Envtl. Law Inst., Beyond Enforcement? Enforcement, Compliance Assistance, and Corporate Leadership Programs 
in Five Midwest States (January 2003); Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and 
Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (April 11, 2000).  The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) experimented with an apparently successful program under which it promised less frequent 
inspection of plants with poor safety records whose operators voluntarily agreed to improve working conditions and 
monitor and report on their progress.  A court invalidated the program, however, based on the agency’s procedural 
violations in adopting it.  See Mark Seidenfeld, An Apology for Administrative Law in the Contracting State, 28 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 215, 218 & n.12 (2000) (citing Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Dep’t of Labor, 174 F.3d 206 
(D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
60 Mark A. Cohen, Empirical Research on the Deterrent Effect of Environmental Monitoring and  
Enforcement, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10245 (2000); Jon D. Silberman, Does Environmental Deterrence Work? Evidence 
and Experience Say Yes, But We Need to Understand How and Why, 30 ENVTL. L. REP.10523 (2000); Simpson et 
al., supra note 21, at 233 (noting that scholars and policymakers know little about effectiveness of different 
corporate crime-control strategies). 
61 E.g., U.S. EPA, RCRA Civil Penalty Policy (June 2003), available at http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/resource-
conservation-and-recovery-act-rcra-civil-penalty-policy; Revision to Adjusted Penalty Policy Matrices Package 
Issues on November 16, 2009, available at http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/revision-adjusted-penalty-policy-
matrices-package-issued-november-16-2009 ; U.S. EPA, Workbook: Timely and Appropriate Enforcement 
Response to High Priority Violations (HPVs) (1999), available at http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/workbook-
timely-and-appropriate-ta-enforcement-response-high-priority-violations-hpvs.  For current EPA efforts to revisit 
CWA enforcement efforts, see Part III infra. 
62 See, e.g., Memorandum: Revision of NPDES Significant Noncompliance (SNC) Criteria to Address Violations of 
Non-Monthly Average Limits, September 21, 1995, available at http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/memorandum-
revision-npdes-significant-noncompliance-snc-criteria-address-violations-non.; David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is 
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Taking a step back conceptually from our review of the mix of tools available to promote 
compliance, debate continues about the appropriate metrics for evaluating enforcement 
performance.  The possibilities include inputs (e.g., the extent of agency resources invested in 
bringing enforcement cases), outputs (e.g., the number of enforcement actions brought), 
outcomes (e.g., the amount of pollution reductions achieved through enforcement actions), and 
environmental results (e.g., changes in the quality of the ambient air or water because of 
enforcement activity).64  Compliance levels have been considered the holy grail by some,65 but 
have proven extremely difficult to use in practice.66 
5. Legitimacy 
Finally, we suggest that an important component of effective regulation is its capacity to 
promote legitimacy, which we define to include enhancing confidence by the public and others.67  
We believe that, in designing and implementing regulatory enforcement and compliance 
mechanisms, it is appropriate for policymakers to ask questions about the effects of different 
design options on public perceptions.  Will a particular regulatory design enhance or diminish 
public confidence in a regulatory program and the government’s ability and willingness to 
promote compliance with it?  A regulatory scheme that leads to a public perception that 
government is corrupt, overbearing, or selective in its enforcement of the law may lead to a loss 
of confidence and trust that undermines effective regulation in many ways, including by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental Crime, and Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1459 (2011) (“The 
EPA emphasizes cases involving significant harm in its policy regarding the exercise of investigative discretion.”). 
63 See, e.g., EPA, Compliance Assistance,  http://www.epa.gov/compliance/assistance/index.html.  
64 Shelley H. Metzenbaum, Strategies for Using State Information: Measuring and Improving State Performance 
20-21 (IBM Center for The Business of Government 2003) (summarizing recent emphasis on outcome indicators for 
performance rather than process); National Academy of Public Administration, Evaluating Environmental Progress: 
How EPA and the States Can Improve the Quality of Enforcement and Compliance Information 10 (2001) (“The 
primary accountability mechanism used by Congress and EPA [for the states] has . . . been counting activities that 
states provide for EPA’s media-specific databases, such as numbers of permits, inspections, enforcement actions, 
and penalty dollars.”); JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 119 (1995) 
(noting that EPA evaluation of its enforcement work is based on numerical indicators).  
65 See Markell, Slack, supra note 47, at 62 (“Many states, among other parties, have identified compliance rates as 
one of the best measures (and perhaps the best measure) of enforcement performance.”). 
66 Id. (noting that “the calculation of such rates in a credible way is a significant challenge”) (citing National 
Academy of Public Administration, Evaluating Environmental Progress: How EPA and the States Can Improve the 
Quality of Enforcement and Compliance Information 27 (2001), available at 
http://www.napawash.org/pc_economy_ environment/environmental.pdf). 
67 For efforts to raise this fifth feature of effective regulation in different contexts, see John H. Knox & David L. 
Markell, Evaluating Citizen Petition Procedures: Lessons from an Analysis of the NAFTA Environmental 
Commission, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 505 (2012); Hammond & Markell, supra note 5.  For discussions of the difficult-to-
define concept of legitimacy, see, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking 
Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 466 (2012) (noting that “[l]egitimacy is a 
notoriously treacherous concept.”).  One way to define the term is to focus on “the acceptability of [a] regulation to 
those involved in its development.”  Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy 
Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 63 (2000).  Such acceptability may hinge on the availability of opportunities for 
public participation and the degree of regulatory transparency.  See Rebecca M. Bratspies, A Regulatory Wake-Up 
Call: Lessons from BP’s Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 7, 59 n.345 (2011) (“Public 
participation and transparency are widely considered to be the backbone of legitimacy for public agencies.”); 
Durwood Zaelke, Matthew Stilwell & Oran Young, What Reason Demands: Making Law Work for Sustainable 
Development, in MAKING LAW WORK, supra note 57, at 42 (describing elements of good governance for sustainable 
development as including anti-corruption and accountability). 
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exacerbating budget pressures if public support for necessary funding diminishes.68   The 
legitimacy of a regulatory system also may turn on the degree to which it protects against 
deviation from legislative goals due to capture of regulators by special interests, and on whether 
decisionmakers are perceived as honest, unbiased, or competent.69  Polling results showing the 
American public’s loss of confidence in the federal government highlight the salience of 
perception by different publics in designing the enforcement aspects of regulatory programs. 70 
B. Inter-Relatedness of the Five Components of Effective Regulation 
The preceding section introduces what we believe to be five important components of 
effective regulation.71  Considering each of these components on its own merits is, we submit, a 
starting point in designing and implementing an effective enforcement and compliance 
promotion regime.  A second layer of analysis involves assessing how the relationships among 
the components affect the manner in which, and the degree to which, policymakers should 
pursue each individual component of effective regulation.  This section focuses on the 
fundamentally inter-related character of different components of the regulatory process in order 
to reinforce the importance of considering regulatory design holistically rather than atomistically.  
The five components of effective enforcement and compliance that we discuss above are 
inter-related in a virtually unlimited number of ways.  We offer a few illustrations in this section.  
In 2007, Colorado’s hazardous waste program was concerned about compliance rates among 
small quantity generators (SQGs) of hazardous waste.72  As backdrop, state regulators believed 
that collectively, SQGs in the state might pose a greater risk to human health and the 
environment than other, larger generators.  This was because in the aggregate SQGs generated a 
considerable amount of waste; they did so at many more locations than large quantity generators; 
and the SQGs had less control over the waste and lower levels of compliance.  Because of 
                                                             
68 Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012), in which landowners challenged an EPA order requiring them to apply 
for a dredge and fill permit under the CWA before developing portions of their land alleged to contain wetlands, 
may be an example of lack of buy-in by some citizens to regulatory goals or means.  The controversy concerning the 
IRS’s purported selection bias in targeting “tea party” groups is another recent example.  See Sheila Krumholz & 
Robert Weinberger, The Real I.R.S. Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2013, at A27 (noting long-term damage to IRS 
credibility in assessing claims of tax-exempt status that “will be difficult to undo”); Rachel E. Barkow, 
Prosecutorial Discretion: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271 (2013) (raising 
concerns about unfettered prosecutorial discretion).  See also supra note 26 (discussing fairness as a component of 
legitimacy). 
69 See Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 5, at 29-31. 
70 See e.g., Joy Wilke & Frank Newport, Fewer Americans than Ever Trust Government to Handle Problems, 
GALLUP POLITICS, Sept. 13, 2013, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/164393/fewer-americans-ever-trust-gov-
handle-problems.aspx.  Some individual agencies, including EPA, tend to poll much higher, however.  At the same 
time that only 19% of respondents in one poll answered that they trust the government to do what is right almost 
always or most of the time, and only 23% viewed Congress favorably, 62% of respondents viewed EPA favorably.  
Pew Research Center, Trust in Government Nears Record Low, but Most Federal Agencies Are Viewed Favorably 
(Oct. 18, 2013), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/10-18-
13%20Trust%20in%20Govt%20Update.pdf  
71 A recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) report notes that “[c]ompliance with pollution control laws is 
addressed through a continuum of response mechanisms, ranging from compliance assistance to administrative and 
civil enforcement, to the stronger criminal enforcement.”  Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note 59, at 19. 
In the previous section, we suggest that the continuum is even broader than the report suggests, reaching at least as 
far back as the initial adoption of regulatory requirements.   
72 This summary of the Colorado program is taken from Schieffelin et al, supra note 15. 
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resource constraints, agency staff were only able to inspect each SQG once every eight years.   In 
the agency’s view, “[t]hat [was] simply not enough to improve compliance” – “[t]he 12 percent 
inspection coverage we were attaining each year did not create enough accountability and 
deterrence to improve compliance rates.”73 
Colorado decided it needed to address the SQG sector in a different way.  It adopted a 
regulation that sought to improve compliance by changing the “verifiability” component and 
enhancing the clarity of the regulatory requirements.  In particular, Colorado required that each 
SQG complete and return a “self-certification checklist” to the agency.  Failure to do so 
subjected a SQG to an enforcement action and the possibility of penalties.  Colorado reports that 
the return rate for the checklists is more than 95 percent. 
Beyond tweaking the verifiability component of its regulatory scheme, Colorado also 
invested considerable effort in improving the scheme’s clarity.  It prepared a comprehensive 
compliance checklist that identified all of the regulatory requirements, and it developed an 
instruction booklet that provided guidance on how to complete each question on the checklist.  
The state sent the checklist and instruction booklet to all members of the regulated community.   
The changes to verifiability, sanctions, and clarity led to significant increases in 
compliance.  As the report on the initiative reflects, “compliance rates across the SQG sector 
have dramatically improved. . .  .  In 2008, only 32 percent of the SQGs were in compliance with 
100 percent of the regulatory requirements. . . . By 2011, this compliance rate had increased to 
84 percent.”74  This example reflects the value of thinking about key components of a 
compliance promotion scheme in an integrated way and happily appears to be an example of a 
significant redesign that yielded impressive improvements in performance.  
A second example of the value of approaching the different components of regulation in 
integrated fashion is not as grounded in a real-world effort to improve environmental 
compliance.  In a recent article, Professor David Freeman Engstrom focuses on one aspect of 
enforcement – enforcement litigation, and in particular private and public enforcement litigation 
– in an effort to improve regulatory design.75  Engstrom considers whether agency “gatekeeping” 
of private enforcement would help to rationalize enforcement litigation; he further considers the 
possible options for designing such a gatekeeping function.   
For example, Engstrom suggests that a strong agency gatekeeping role to limit or direct 
private enforcement might be appropriate when there is a significant risk that private 
enforcement will yield legislative drift “as private enforcers drive law enforcement efforts in new 
and democratically unaccountable directions. . . .”76   It seems reasonable to conclude that the 
clearer the substantive rules that govern the conduct of regulated entities, the lower the risk that 
courts, responding to suits by non-governmental organizations (NGO)s, will accept novel 
applications of legal mandates that amount to such legislative drift.  Under these circumstances, 
all other things being equal, the need for agencies to exercise veto authority over private 
enforcement efforts should recede.  On the other hand, in some cases, clear requirements may 
contribute to dramatic reductions in non-compliance and hence in the need for enforcement, 
                                                             
73 Id. at 4-5. 
74 Id. at 1. 
75 Engstrom, supra note _3. 
76 Id. at 637-41. 
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private or public.  The value of private enforcement may decline in such circumstances, which 
might affect analysis of the desired mix of rewards and sanctions and, in particular, the 
appropriateness of incorporating a private enforcement feature in a compliance program.  
The ability of regulated entities to comply with regulatory norms (the achievability 
component) also is salient in thinking through the desirability and structure of Engstrom’s 
gatekeeping apparatus as part of a regulatory scheme’s sanctions function.  If compliance is 
particularly difficult, public enforcers might choose to exercise prosecutorial discretion and defer 
prosecution of known violations, or reduce the penalties assessed for such violations, perhaps in 
return for commitments by regulated entities to sink resources into developing a fix for the 
implementation problem.77  A gatekeeper regime that empowered NGOs to initiate private 
enforcement actions might interfere with commitments that regulated entities might otherwise 
make to public enforcers.78  In circumstances in which achievability is a concern, the arguments 
in favor of a strong public gatekeeping role for private enforcement actions may be relatively 
appealing.79  On the other hand, problems with achievability may create more, and more 
significant, non-compliance problems that may overwhelm public enforcement capacity.  The 
incorporation of private enforcement litigation as a component of an enforcement regime would 
seem to hold special value in such cases.80 
Consideration of Professor Engstrom’s gatekeeping scenario also shows that verifiability 
is not only a critical feature of regulation in its own right, but is also important because of its 
effect on other components of regulatory compliance design.  Easy and cheap access by  private 
enforcers to information revealing compliance status creates a risk of overdeterrence, at least if 
one regards what Professor Engstrom refers to as the “zealousness critique” of private 
enforcement as a significant concern.81  If access to information concerning compliance status is 
available at little if any cost, private enforcers may pursue actions in which their expected return 
on investment in litigation will exceed their own costs, even if public enforcers would choose not 
to sue because the expected social cost exceeds the expected social gain.  Thus, low verification 
                                                             
77 EPA engages in this practice frequently.  See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation: 
Is Enforcement Discretion the Answer?, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1327, 1330-34 (2004) (describing EPA’s flexible and 
pragmatic approach to enforcement, including reliance on investment by regulated entities in supplemental 
environmental projects). 
78 Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental Citizen Suits Became an 
Entitlement Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S. Greve & Fred 
L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992); Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339 
(1990). 
79 See infra Part IA4 for discussion of gatekeeping as part of the mix of rewards and sanctions component of 
effective regulation. 
80 This was Congress’s reasoning in including a citizen suit provision in the CWA.  Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. 
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987). 
81 Engstrom, supra note 3, at 630-34 (suggesting that private enforcers may be overzealous because their 
motivations may differ from goal of maximizing social welfare).  Engstrom is not alone in identifying the hazards of 
reliance on private enforcement.  See, e.g., Peter Grabosky, Beyond Responsive Regulation: The Expanding Role of 
Non-State Actors in the Regulatory Process, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 114, 119 (2013) (noting concerns about private 
regulatory failure, lack of accountability, and private overzealousness).  As Grabosky colorfully puts it, “the sword 
of citizen participation is two-edged.  One would not wish to see the advent of wiki witch hunts.”  Id. at ___.  See 
also Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999). 
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costs may increase the risk that public and private assessments of the relative costs and value of 
enforcement diverge, resulting in over-expenditure of social resources and over-deterrence.82 
The likelihood of overzealousness remains in dispute, however, and gatekeeping regimes 
may be structured to minimize it (if, indeed, they are needed at all).  For example, the absence of 
a damage remedy for successful private enforcers under the citizen suit provisions of the federal 
environmental statutes should minimize this risk.  Likewise, these provisions all require that 
penalties by paid to the United States Treasury, not to private enforcers.83  Further, some 
scholars, such as Professor Barton Thompson, have suggested that “the benefits of citizen suits 
have far outstripped the benefits that Congress originally identified,”84 even assuming that some 
over-deterrence occurs, because of the potential for private enforcers to create enforcement 
innovations that may be attractive to public enforcers, the promotion of democratic values that 
direct citizen participation in law enforcement yields, and the educational value of citizen suits.85  
The larger point still stands, however:  the design of the verifiability component of effective 
regulation affects how other aspects of environmental regulation should be structured, including 
the appropriate mix of rewards and sanctions. 
A final reflection on the inter-related character of different components of effective 
environmental regulation relates to the relationship between the mix of sanctions and rewards 
and legitimacy, and is again illustrated in connection with the desirability of a gatekeeping 
mechanism.  A regulatory design that gives a government agency extremely powerful 
gatekeeping authority might undermine legitimacy if the public’s perception is that an agency is 
choking off much-needed private enforcement.86  Such a loss of legitimacy is most likely to be 
the case if an agency is widely perceived of as corrupt or captured; extensive opportunities for 
supplemental private enforcement may help to restore a sense of legitimacy to the regulatory 
program, and in particular its enforcement component.  Less obviously, Professor Engstrom 
discusses “bubble periods,” during which ambiguous regulatory mandates remain unsettled.87  
He posits that vigorous private enforcement may be troublesome during these transitional periods 
because judicial responses to private enforcement actions may be difficult to override 
legislatively and enforcement targets may suffer costly adverse judgments notwithstanding 
subsequent overrides.  In such cases, allowing private enforcement might undermine legitimacy 
in the eyes of the regulated community at a minimum.  This effect would support a strong 
                                                             
82 See Engstrom, supra note 3, at 630-31.  See also Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 11, 25 (2014) (describing this problem in connection with implied private rights of action); id. at 46 (“financial 
incentives may play an important role in the decision to sue, which can lead to excessive litigation and 
overdeterrence”); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship 
Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1341 (2008) (arguing that, 
under the securities laws, private enforcers’ “profit motive is inherently misaligned with the public's interest in 
achieving optimal deterrence”). 
83 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), 1319(d).   
84 Thompson, supra note 23, at 198.  In assessing the zealousness critique, Thompson added that evidence “suggests 
that environmental nonprofits have filed a sizable number of worthwhile actions that public enforcers either 
purposefully or unintentionally failed to pursue.”  Id. at 203.  See also id. at 206 (discounting risk of “zealousness 
error” from citizen suits). 
85 Thompson, supra note 23, at 188.  
86 William Andreen and Sidney Shapiro each suggested this possibility in helpful comments on a draft of this article.  
See Andreen, Motivating Enforcement, supra note 48, at 84-85 (suggesting that some states filed a significant 
number of enforcement actions only after a citizen had filed a notice of intent to sue). 
87 Engstrom, supra note 3, at 640. 
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gatekeeping regime.88  But if agency’s delay in filling statutory gaps is due not to the costs of 
regulation but instead to agency disaffection with the statutory regime, private enforcement may 
help to maintain public confidence in the rule of law.  This scenario would seem to favor a weak 
or nonexistent gatekeeping regime. 
C. Contextual Design Challenges  
The preceding discussion identifies five key components of effective regulation.   In 
addition, it demonstrates that effective design must consider each component as it relates to the 
others, rather than solely as a distinct and isolated regulatory feature.  The following section 
discusses four contextual issues facing policymakers responsible for regulatory design, which 
may enrich, and complicate, analysis of how best to craft a program that settles on the best mix 
of the five components of effective regulation addressed above.89  These four contextual design 
issues are the hybrid character of much of contemporary governance; the need to confront actual 
performance; the dynamic nature of governance challenges and opportunities; and salience, the 
need to prioritize in making design and implementation decisions.90  We list these elements in 
Table 2.  
Table 2 – Key Design Elements  
Hybrid Character of Governance 
Reality checking in terms of past performance and future challenges 
and opportunities 
Dynamic Character 
Salience – the need to Prioritize 
 
Figure 1 depicts how the five components of effective regulation described in section A 
interact with these four contextual design challenges. 
[Figure 1 to be added; it will show the interconnectedness of the five components and four 
contextual design challenges] 
In short, as Figure 1 shows, each of the contextual design challenges has the potential to affect 
one or more components of effective enforcement and compliance promotion.  As a result, it is 
the interaction of the contextual design challenges and the components of effective regulation 
                                                             
88 Id. at 639-40. 
89 As is true for virtually all efforts to capture reality through categories, the identity and parameters of the categories 
are open to question. 
90 We do not claim that these four contextual issues are the only ones relevant to the design of effective enforcement 
and compliance programs.  We believe all four are important to consider, however, in thinking about possible 
enforcement and compliance promotion options.  
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that should shape the design of each component of an enforcement and compliance program such 
as gatekeeping mechanisms.91  The remainder of this section elaborates on these interactions. 
1.  Hybrid Governance 
One contextual reality of contemporary governance in the United States is its hybrid 
character.  At its most abstract level, we view hybrid government to mean governance “formed 
or composed of heterogeneous elements.”92  Several manifestations of the hybrid character of 
governance are well known and we mention them only briefly.  In terms of horizontal hybrid 
governance issues, both the U.S. Constitution and the foundational statute for the administrative 
state, the Administrative Procedure Act, reserve specific roles for the three branches of our 
federal government.93  The ongoing debate about the appropriate role for the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB)’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
highlights the tension concerning the distribution of power between and among Congress, the 
President, and federal agencies.94  The lack of judicial review of much of what OIRA does raises 
issues concerning the appropriate role of the judicial branch in presidential review of agency 
activities as well.  More generally, increasing recognition that multiple federal agencies need to 
be engaged in addressing many of the most significant public policy issues we face today reflects 
that horizontal coordination challenges exist within, between, and among agencies.  These 
challenges pose a significant barrier to effective governance.95  
The cooperative federalism structure Congress adopted in enacting the major federal 
pollution control statutes contributes to the hybrid character of contemporary enforcement and 
compliance work by giving states a major role in administrative governance.  An enormous 
scholarship addresses the vertical governance challenges the cooperative federalism structure 
poses, including in the enforcement and compliance realm.96  Over the past few years, EPA has 
acknowledged these challenges and announced renewed efforts to grapple with them more 
effectively.97  The states’ central role in the enforcement and compliance promotion function has 
heavily influenced the design of EPA’s programs; this will no doubt continue to be the case for 
the indefinite future. 
Governance is much more than simply the actions of government actors, however, and 
the quality of governance often benefits (or suffers) from the actions of these multiple 
                                                             
91 Professor Engstrom’s focus on rationalization of private and public enforcement litigation as a central challenge 
of administrative governance illustrates the importance of our first contextual design challenge, hybrid governance.  
Engstrom, supra note 3. 
92 http://www.thefreedictionary.com/hybrid.  
93 U.S. CONST. arts. I-III; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (empowering reviewing courts to hold agencies accountable by 
invalidating actions that are in excess of statutory authority). 
94 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 1838 (2013); Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097 
(2006). 
95 Climate change adaptation is a prominent example.  See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117, 
52,124 (Oct. 5, 2009); and Exec. Order No. 13653, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,819, 66,823 (Nov. 1, 2013) (directing agencies 
to participate in task force to coordinate action on climate preparedness and resilience.).  See also Camacho & 
Glicksman, supra note 5; Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1131 (2012). 
96 For a sampling of this literature, see the sources cited in Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 5, at 21 n.6. 
97 See infra Part III. 
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stakeholders.98  The value in assessing alternative regulatory design options, not only to 
acknowledge the reality, but also to assess both the promise and perils of different variations of 
hybrid governance, is difficult to overstate.  In part this is because of the recognition that 
government cannot “solve” problems on its own and that a well-designed “pluralistic regulatory 
landscape” improves chances for success.99   As Professor Magali Delmas has noted, “the 
inadequacy of governments to resolve some environmental issues has generated the search for 
alternative governance mechanisms.”100  
Considerable work engaging the appropriate shape of this pluralistic regulatory landscape 
has been done, such as contributions to the “new governance” literature.101  But as Professor 
Delmas points out, a great deal of additional work is needed:  “the research on environmental 
governance without government, or between government and other actors, is only just 
emerging.”102  Contextualized treatment of this pluralistic landscape is in our view likely to be of 
especial importance and practical value.103  To illustrate its value, we offer such contextualized 
treatment of one example of hybrid governance, the use of agency gatekeeping to rationalize 
public and private enforcement litigation, a topic considered recently by Professor Engstrom. 
EPA already has significant gatekeeping authority, as Professor Engstrom notes.104  We 
consider here how EPA’s exercise of this authority might influence the capacities of public and 
private enforcers and affect environmental regulatory enforcement and compliance.  All other 
things being equal, EPA would seemingly want to exercise its gatekeeping power lightly in order 
to encourage private enforcement litigation in circumstances in which other strategies for 
inducing compliance, such as reliance on positive incentives, do not yield desired results. Indeed, 
in addition to exercising its gatekeeping responsibilities with a light touch, EPA might want to 
engage private enforcers affirmatively to encourage invigorated private enforcement efforts.   
Similarly, an agency posture of weak gatekeeping might be desirable where obstacles (such as 
limited government enforcement resources) exist to traditional government deterrence-based 
enforcement.105  In other words, an agency may opt for relatively weak gatekeeping when limited 
government capacity exists. 
                                                             
98 See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 ILL. L. REV. 1 (defining 
hybrid governance to include multiple levels of government and private entities).  See also Grabosky, supra note 81, 
at 118 (suggesting that technology advances may engender “wiki-regulation”); THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A 
GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) [hereinafter TOOLS OF 
GOVERNMENT]; Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000). 
99 Engstrom, supra note 3, at 629. 
100 Id. at 629. 
101 See supra note 9 (citing examples of new governance literature). 
102 GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3, at 223. 
103 Engstrom refers to the “complex ecologies of enforcement” within which multiple public and private enforcers 
operate and with which they interact.  Engstrom, supra note 3, at 623; see also id. at 662 (arguing that “an ideal 
gatekeeper agency focused on optimal deterrence will join and leverage the enforcement efforts of overmatched 
private enforcers who will not otherwise fully vindicate the public interest”). For another recent example of analysis 
of regulatory design of public enforcement mechanisms, see Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public 
Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV.  853 (2014).   
104 See also infra notes 110, 211 and accompanying text (describing diligent prosecution bar). 
105 On the other hand, attention to other components of the regulatory process, such as clarity and verifiability, might 
be even more effective, as the Colorado hazardous waste example referred to above reflects.  See supra note 15.  
Our purpose in this section is to consider EPA’s use of its existing gatekeeping authority, not to propose reforms in 
the scope or nature of that authority.  Several experts on workers’ health and safety laws have urged the creation of a 
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Conversely, EPA may want to exercise its gatekeeping authority aggressively if it is 
concerned that expansive private enforcement will undermine national consistency in 
approaching compliance challenges.106  For example, private enforcement efforts that focus on 
securing particular types of relief with which an agency has concerns, in lieu of the types of 
relief it favors, may influence the desirability of a significant private enforcement presence107 
because of both legislative fidelity and coordination issues, to use Professor Engstrom’s terms.108 
Professor Engstrom’s focus on agency gatekeeping as a mechanism to take advantage of 
the hybrid character of enforcement litigation gives little attention to another key actor, state 
agencies.  The cooperative federalism structure of the environmental laws, and the central role of 
the states in enforcement, is an important part of the discussion in attempting to rationalize 
public and private enforcement of those laws.109  Thus, state capacity (in terms of resources and 
will) in bringing enforcement actions is an important issue in assessing the need for and 
desirability of EPA’s exercise of its gatekeeping authority.   
We also think it is important in rationalizing enforcement litigation to be aware that a 
state, like EPA, can prevent the filing of a citizen suit by commencing and “diligently 
prosecuting” its own enforcement action after being notified by a prospective citizen suit 
plaintiff that it intends to file suit against an alleged violator.110  Complaints have been made 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
citizen suit provision analogous to those in many federal pollution statutes to supplement the government’s 
inadequate enforcement initiatives under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678, 
that has resulted, among other things, from a shortage of inspectors.  See Martha McCluskey et al., The Next OSHA: 
Progressive Reforms to Empower Workers, Center for Progressive Reform White Paper 4-5 (July 2012), available at 
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Next_Generation_OSHA_1207.pdf.  Others have urged the addition of 
citizen suit provisions to other statutes, such as those dealing with food labeling, to redress perceived government 
enforcement shortcomings.  See, e.g., James Springer, The Success of the Citizen Suit: Protecting Consumers from 
Inaccurate Food Labeling by Amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 401 
(2013). 
106 Cf. Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Petitions and Public Production of 
Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321, 329-30 (2010) (describing disruptions to the agenda of 
the Consumer Product Safety Commission resulting from expansive citizen petition mechanism). 
107 See, e.g., David S. Mann, Comment, Polluter-Financed Environmentally Beneficial Expenditures: Effective or 
Improper Abuse of Citizen Suits under the Clean Water Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 175, 192-94 (1991) (describing Justice 
Department efforts to block citizen suit settlements involving expenditures by defendants on environmentally 
beneficial projects).  Cf. Robert D. Snook, Environmental Citizen Suits and Judicial Interpretation: First Time 
Tragedy, Second Time Farce, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 311, 328 (1998) (noting tendency of some to “look hard for 
reasons to block citizen suits that are perceived as infringing on government prerogatives or wasting government 
assets”). 
108 Engstrom identifies three critiques of private enforcement – zealousness, legislative fidelity, and coordination.  In 
his view, coordination problems stemming from a mixed public-private enforcement regime include wasteful 
duplication of effort and a lack of coherence that disrupts cooperative relationships between regulators and 
regulatory targets.  Engstrom, supra note 3, at 634-37.  This issue has arisen in the context of supplemental 
environmental projects, among others.  See David L. Markell, Is There a Possible Role for Regulatory Enforcement 
in the Effort to Value, Protect, and Restore Ecosystem Services?, 22 J. OF ENVTL.& LAND USE  L. 549 (2007). 
109 States are typically the primary enforcers under federal pollution statutes such as the CWA, as indicated below.  
See infra Part IIA.  Our comment in the text that Professor Engstrom gives little attention to state enforcement is not 
meant as a criticism, but instead simply highlights the wider lens of analysis we sought to bring to this project 
compared to Professor Engstrom’s effective and thoughtful effort to focus more narrowly on the agency gatekeeping 
mechanism for influencing private enforcement litigation. 
110 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 7603(b)(1)(B).  To this extent, the 
federal pollution laws already include a gatekeeping mechanism. 
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over the years that some states have reacted to citizen suit notices by commencing an 
enforcement action against the putative civil suit defendant and then settling the action on terms 
favorable to the regulated entity because that entity was important to the state’s economy or had 
valuable political connections.111  EPA has the authority, and responsibility, to exercise a 
different type of gatekeeping authority when it learns of state action that may undermine 
effective enforcement – here, the federal gatekeeping authority involves EPA’s authority to 
withdraw a state’s authorization.112  Effective enforcement to address significant violations under 
the environmental laws is a three-legged stool, with each leg (federal, state, and private 
enforcement) having multiple pieces.  EPA actually has at least two types of gatekeeping 
authority available to rationalize the use of enforcement tools given the multiple actors involved.   
While we have devoted a few pages to the particular context of agency gatekeeping of 
private enforcement litigation in an effort to illustrate the importance of considering the hybrid 
character of enforcement and compliance contextually, a final point about the hybrid character of 
this realm is that the range of actors involved in such governance obviously extends far beyond 
agency and private enforcers.  Similarly, the opportunities for hybrid governance to promote 
effective compliance and enforcement extend far beyond the realm of ex post enforcement 
litigation.113  A critical observation about this central feature of contemporary governance is that 
efforts to enhance compliance should take into account how best to engage all stakeholders 
throughout the entire regulatory process.114 
                                                             
111 See, e.g., Andreen, Motivating Enforcement, supra note 48, at 85 (“While one might think that this notice 
provision would often shame the government into taking tough action, it has often been used, in a rather perverse 
fashion, ‘to blunt more vigorous citizen enforcement efforts.’”); Trip Gabriel, Michael Wines & Cotal Davenport, 
Chemical Spill Muddies Picture n a State Wary of Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2014 (quoting attorney for 
environmental NGO, who claimed that “[t]he state stepped in with sweetheart deals every time we threatened to 
sue” facility in West Virginia responsible for chemical spill); Regulatory Favoritism in North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 17, 2014 (referring to the “tawdry tale” of maneuvering by state regulators to block citizen suits against 
politically powerful utility company); Trip Gabriel, Ash Spill Shows How Watchdog Was Defanged, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 1, 2014 (quoting attorney for environmental NGO who complained that North Carolina filed an enforcement 
action that precluded a CWA citizen suit and then entered “a behind-closed-doors settlement” requiring no cleanup). 
112 Hammond & Markell, supra note 5. 
113 According to Delmas, “the inadequacy of governments to resolve some environmental issues has generated the 
search for alternative governance mechanisms.”  GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3, at 223.  There 
are enormous varieties of governance, including self-regulation in the form of Responsible Care, see American 
Chemistry Council, Responsible Care, http://responsiblecare.americanchemistry.com/?gclid=CN6klbiLkroCFQ-
g4AodLVQAIQ, supply chain influences, and certification schemes.  See ISO 14001: ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (2004); John C. Cruden, The Brave New World of Private Governance, 30 ENVTL. F. 60, 
60 (2013) (discussing private certification standards for private forests); Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-
Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1, 14 (2012).  Regulatory instruments may entail elements of state, self-
regulatory, and third-party activity.  Grabosky, supra note 81, at 120. 
114 It is worthwhile to consider the roles that NGOs of all stripes play today in each of our five components of 
effective regulation.  See Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note 59, at 1 (listing federal, state, tribal, and 
local governments, regulated parties, courts, interest groups, and the general public as relevant stakeholders).  For 
discussion of the roles of NGOs during different parts of the regulatory process, see, e.g., Wendy Wagner, Katherine 
Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Toxic Air Emission Standards, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 151 (2011) (suggesting that the predominance of certain stakeholders may skew the regulatory 
process in unanticipated ways that frustrate regulatory goals, and concluding that “at least some publicly important 
rules that emerge from the regulatory state may be influenced heavily by regulated parties, with little to no 
counterpressure from the public interest”); Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note 59, at 14.  See also EPA-
OECA, Report on Environmental Violation, http://www.epa.gov/tips (discussing an initiative, entitled the “National 
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2. “Reality Checks” as a Contextual Design Issue 
A second type of contextual issue relevant to the design of regulatory enforcement 
structures is what we term the “reality check” feature.  In assessing or revisiting regulatory 
design, it is critical to assess the agency’s (here EPA’s) actual performance in conducting 
enforcement, the challenges the agency has faced, and opportunities to improve performance by 
altering regulatory features or practices in ways suggested by past experience.  As we discuss in 
more detail in Parts II and III below, EPA has experienced and acknowledged significant 
shortcomings in its enforcement and compliance program.  There are opportunities to improve on 
this track record with respect to each of the five components of effective regulation identified 
above,115 as well as significant challenges in doing so. 
3. Dynamism 
The degree of dynamism is a third contextual issue relevant to regulatory design.  This 
feature does not receive much attention in some of the regulatory design literature,116 but we 
believe it deserves emphasis.  Effective regulatory design requires an understanding of the extent 
to which key features of regulation are likely to be static or dynamic over time.  This feature 
differs from the reality check feature in that it focuses not on whether existing regulatory 
practices have worked as anticipated, but on whether the regulatory environment itself has 
shifted in ways that affect regulatory goals. 
Concerns that climate change is causing transformative shifts in the environment are 
becoming more widespread.  Scholars and others are beginning to consider the impacts of such 
changes on not only the content of regulation, but also on regulatory structure.  For example, 
Professors Robin Craig and J.B. Ruhl recently suggested that the impacts of climate change 
warrant a fundamental reappraisal of the structure of agency procedures.  In particular, they 
urged more attention be given to adaptive approaches to governance rather than what they 
consider to be unavoidably limited ex ante approaches: 
The idea of adaptive management is that agencies should be free to make more decisions, 
but that the timing of those decisions is spread out into a continuous process that makes 
differentiating between the “front end” and the “back end” of decisionmaking much less 
relevant.  Rather than make one grand decision and move on, agencies employing 
adaptive management engage in a program of iterative decisionmaking following a 
structured, multistep protocol:  (1) definition of the problem, (2) determination of goals 
and objectives for management, (3) determination of the baseline, (4) development of 
conceptual models, (5) selection of future actions, (6) implementation and management 
actions, (7) monitoring, and (8) evaluation and return to step (1).117 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Report a Violation” website, which was designed to encourage citizens to report potential environmental violations 
to promote verifiability); Hammond & Markell, supra note 5 (noting that citizens may file petitions with EPA 
asserting that a state is not effectively enforcing its environmental laws, prompting EPA to investigate potential 
shortcomings). 
115 See supra Part IA. 
116  See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 3. 
117 Craig & Ruhl, supra note 12, at 7. 
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In addition, changes in agency staffing levels and financial resources, improvements in 
monitoring technology, and the capacity of regulated parties and NGOs to participate in 
regulatory implementation are among a litany of factors that affect EPA’s capacity for effective 
governance, especially as it pertains to enforcement and compliance.118  EPA should consider 
these changes in formulating and implementing approaches to achieving desired levels of 
enforcement and compliance more generally.  EPA is already taking steps to do so.   For 
example, to address compliance challenges EPA is increasingly relying heavily on new 
monitoring tools and data management capabilities.  These include infrared cameras that can 
detect pollution emissions otherwise invisible to the naked eye and electronic reporting such as 
EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Reporting Tool that are intended to save time and money, increase 
transparency, and ultimately yield improved compliance.119  
Thus, the contextual reality of dynamism suggests that an indispensable component of 
regulatory design is awareness of the likelihood that normative objectives may change over time.  
It is also important to consider the shifting capabilities and interests of different key actors 
throughout the entire regulatory enterprise and the extent to which these developments should 
influence design of regulatory structures.120 
4. Salience 
A final part of the regulatory design puzzle is the importance of salience.  In a world of 
limited resources, policymakers interested in regulatory design to improve compliance should 
prioritize changing certain aspects of the regulatory process more than others.121  Informed 
deliberation about possible redesign of agency governance strategies requires attention to the 
nature and priority of the challenges an agency faces.  It also requires consideration of all of the 
opportunities available to improve performance.   
To return to Professor Engstrom’s effort to rationalize integration of private enforcers 
into the public compliance promotion effort, the possibility of and parameters for agency 
gatekeeping is likely to be a salient issue in many contexts (environmental and otherwise) in the 
                                                             
118 The full array of ways in which the regulatory environment may shift is beyond the scope of this article.  A rich 
literature investigates how regulated parties are motivated by different factors, including utilitarian considerations, 
cultural norms, and habits.  It is worth considering all of these sources of motivation, and how they may shift over 
time, in regulatory design.  See, e.g., GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3, at 9, 223; Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, Amanda P. Carrico & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
715 (2011); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation Can Protect the 
Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101 (2005); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of 
Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55 (2003); Neil Gunningham, Robert 
A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond 
Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307 (2004).  
119  Giles, supra note 24, at 24-25. 
120 The contextual design challenges we have identified may affect each other.  Approaches such as “new 
governance” approaches are typically dynamic, for example.  See, e.g., Grabosky, supra note 81, at ___ (suggesting 
that the increased role of NGOs stems partly from a retreat by government that has created a regulatory vacuum).  
Grabosky suggests that “regulatory space is contested, and resulting relational interactions between institutions are 
often complex.”  Id. at 116.  Some, including Engstrom, favor orchestration of different actors, while others “may 
see a regulatory system characterized by spontaneity as inevitable.”  Id. at 115-16. 
121 As indicated in Part III, prioritization is an important feature of EPA’s ongoing effort to reinvent its CWA 
enforcement approach.   Prioritization based on risk is also an important feature of Canada’s effort, especially given 
increasing demands and limited resources.  Auditor General Report, supra note 3, at 9. 
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effort to improve regulatory compliance.  It seems indisputable, at least to us, however, that an 
agency’s first step when confronting an enforcement challenge should not be to automatically 
focus on any single component of the regulatory scheme, such as the appropriate structure of an 
agency gatekeeping regime.122  This is a well-understood concept:  while hammers work well for 
nails, other tools are better for other circumstances.  Before moving forward to address a 
particular enforcement or compliance challenge, an agency should be sure it considers the five 
key components of environmental enforcement and compliance outlined in Part IA and the 
contextual design issues addressed in this section to assess which mix of viable options is likely 
to prove most effective.   
In the Colorado hazardous waste initiative we discuss above,123 for example, a state 
agency made a judgment to prioritize promoting compliance in a particular sector of the 
regulated community because of features of that community (e.g., high levels of noncompliance, 
significant aggregate volumes of waste generated).  The agency was then able to make 
significant improvements in its regulatory approach by refining a few of our key components of 
effective regulation, notably clarity, verifiability, and the mix of sanctions for noncompliance.  
There was little need to consider rationalization of public and private enforcement litigation as 
part of this redesign.  The Colorado example obviously does not mean that the particular 
strategies used there to improve clarity and verification and, ultimately, compliance, should be 
used across the board.  Other noncompliance challenges will require different responses to yield 
desired results.  Ultimately, agencies would be well-advised to engage in priority-setting on 
multiple levels when addressing enforcement and compliance concerns.  A first level involves 
identifying the challenges that most need attention.  The second involves identifying the mix of 
tools that is most likely to be effective.  We suggest that both the components of regulation and 
contextual design issues discussed in this Part offer a starting point for taking this second step in 
a systematic and thoughtful way.124 
II. Contextualizing the Conceptual Framework for Effective Regulatory Compliance Design: 
An Overview of EPA’s Compliance Track Record and Challenges 
As Part I indicates, informed regulatory design requires an understanding of the entire 
regulatory process and of the actors who play critical roles throughout that process, whether the 
goal is the design of a regulatory scheme writ large, or of a particular piece of that scheme such 
as the enforcement and compliance promotion function.  We now turn to a brief review of some 
of the real-world compliance-related challenges and opportunities EPA faces to illustrate the 
importance of context in regulatory design.  In doing so, we focus on the second and third design 
challenges introduced in Part IC – the need to consider an agency’s experience based on past 
performance of the regulatory structures being assessed for possible revision and the ways in 
                                                             
122 We are not suggesting that Professor Engstrom would urge that such a first step focus on gatekeeping or any 
other particular component of the enforcement process.  Our discussion in the text is intended to provide a wide lens 
for considering the value of scholarship that offers a more particularized focus on a single regulatory design 
mechanism, such as Professor Engstrom’s consideration of agency gatekeeping strategies. 
123 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. 
124 Others have pointed to the challenges facing agencies in the enforcement and compliance realm.  See Esworthy, 
How Are They Enforced?, supra note 59, at 5 (noting that policymakers must determine “how to balance punishment 
and deterrence through litigation with compliance assistance, incentive approaches, self-auditing or correction, and 
voluntary compliance”). 
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which the dynamic nature of the regulatory environment bears on regulatory design, particularly 
of effective enforcement and compliance structures. 
Evaluating effectiveness in inducing compliance is an extraordinarily difficult task.125  It 
is worth being mindful of the old adage about optimists seeing the glass half full and pessimists 
seeing the same glass as half empty in considering EPA’s performance and appraisals of its 
enforcement efforts.  Nevertheless, a wide variety of observers, inside and outside government, 
have identified significant concerns over EPA efforts to promote compliance.  EPA faces 
substantial barriers in overcoming these challenges, including resource constraints (its own and 
those of the states), and a changing (in some cases expanding) regulated community.  There are, 
however, some promising signs on the regulatory design horizon as well.   
 
The salient point about the contextual overview we provide in this Part is that extant and 
upcoming challenges, as well as emerging opportunities, demonstrate that efforts to improve 
regulatory design should proceed with an understanding of the nature of the challenges an 
agency has faced and will face and the tools available to meet those challenges.  For example, 
concerns that a regulatory design that enables private enforcement suits will lead to problems 
with private enforcement such as overzealousness, coordination challenges, or infidelity to 
legislative objectives are likely to be fairly minor in a context in which there is rampant 
noncompliance, violations are causing significant environmental degradation and harm to public 
health, and responsible agencies have proved incapable of or unwilling to enforce against 
substantial numbers of significant violators.  On the other hand, such concerns are likely to be 
much more relevant when compliance challenges are complex and require sophisticated, 
integrated strategies, and a responsible agency’s efforts to address these challenges efficiently 
and effectively are likely to be undermined by the presence of a host of other erstwhile enforcers. 
 
 A. Agency Enforcement Records  
 
 The Government Accountability Office (GAO), EPA’s Office of Inspector General 
(OIG), EPA’s Administrator, and EPA’s own enforcement office have all offered highly critical 
assessments of EPA’s performance in promoting compliance with environmental regulatory 
                                                             
125 Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note 59, at 5, 40 (noting that “how best to measure the success and 
effectiveness of enforcement” is an issue of continuing interest and that evaluating and measuring the effectiveness 
of enforcement and compliance activities “can be quite complicated”).  EPA acknowledged this reality recently in a 
draft strategy for improving oversight of state enforcement.  U.S. EPA, National Strategy for Improving Oversight 
of State Enforcement Performance 2-3 (Aug. 27, 2013 draft) [hereinafter EPA, Improving Oversight], available at 
http://environblog.jenner.com/files/national-strategy-for-improving-oversight-of-state-enforcement-performance.pdf 
(link provided in Steven M. Siros, EPA Proposes Increased Oversight Of State Enforcement Activities (Oct. 18, 
2013), available at http://environblog.jenner.com/corporate_environmental_l/2013/10/epa-proposes-increased-
oversight-over-state-enforcement-activities.html) (noting complexity of measuring state enforcement and that EPA’s 
data are incomplete in part because its current metrics are based on activities states perform, rather than compliance 
levels within regulated sectors, which are difficult to determine).  There is an extensive measurement literature.  The 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), in its various manifestations, seeks to focus on results and their 
measurement.  See, e.g., Office of Management and Budget, Delivering on the Accountable Government Initiative 
and Implementing the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (April 14, 2001), M-11-17, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m11-17.pdf; U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, Managing for Results: GPRA Modernization Act Implementation Provides Important Opportunities to 
Address Government Challenges (May 10, 2011, GAO-11-617T), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
11-617T.  
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requirements.126  In a December 2012 report, for example, the GAO noted that “[i]n recent years, 
EPA has reported that it is not achieving all of the environmental and public health benefits it 
expected in regulating certain entities because of substantial rates of noncompliance in some 
programs.”127 Compounding the challenge in inducing compliance at desired levels is the 
enforcers’ ignorance of the scope of the problem they are addressing.  As the GAO also noted, 
“because of incomplete or unreliable data on compliance in some programs, such as the 
[National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program under the CWA], 
EPA cannot determine the full extent of entities’ compliance.”128  Scholars also have noted 
EPA’s failure to require regulated entities to submit the kinds of information needed for accurate 
agency assessment of compliance status.129 
 
 Concerns about government enforcement extend beyond EPA’s performance.  An 
essential feature of many of the key environmental regulatory statutes is their reliance on a 
cooperative federalism structure.  Congress has enacted pollution control laws such as the CAA 
and CWA, charging EPA with ultimate responsibility for implementing these laws and achieving 
their goals (through actions that include standard-setting, review of state-issued permits, and 
concurrent enforcement authority).  It has also empowered qualified and interested states, 
however, to play a significant role in implementation, through planning, permitting, and 
enforcement, under laws states adopt for that purpose.130  It has done so, among other reasons, 
out of respect for state sovereignty, especially in areas of traditional state concern,131 to take 
advantage of state expertise about local conditions, to support the legitimacy of environmental 
regulation, and to enhance the total resources available to tackle environmental problems.132 
Over the years, EPA has authorized increasing numbers of states to take primary responsibility 
for implementation of the major environmental laws, and the states are regarded as the primary 
enforcers under the major federal environmental regulatory statutes.133  As a result, much of the 
                                                             
126 For a recent collection of some of the reviews, see Esworthy, How Can They Be Enforced?, supra note 59, at 2-4. 
See infra Part III for additional discussion of concerns about EPA’s enforcement record. 
127 U.S. Government Accountability Office, EPA Should Develop a Strategic Plan for Its New Compliance 
Initiative, GAO-13-115, at 1-2 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650711.pdf [hereinafter 
GAO, Strategic Plan].  
128 Id. at 1-2.   
129 See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 
1348-49 (2010) (data inadequacies concerning regulatory requirements for toxic air pollutant emissions). 
130 EPA has the opportunity to play a significant role even if a state is authorized to implement a program.  For a 
description of cooperative federalism under federal environmental statutes, see generally Robert L. Glicksman, 
From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 719 (2006).  Not all of the federal environmental statutes are built on a cooperative federalism 
foundation.  Statutes such as the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y, and the 
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2697, for example, are not. 
131 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (“It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary 
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution . . . .”).  See also 42 U.S.C. § 
7401(a)(3) (concerning air pollution); 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (concerning solid waste management). 
132 See Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 90 (2011); William W. Buzbee, State Greenhouse 
Gas Regulation, Federal Climate Change Legislation, and the Preemption Sword, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & 
ENERGY L. 23, 35-37 (2009) (“Empowering state and local governments to play their own supplementary roles in 
enforcing the law could be the equivalent of additional cops on the beat.”). 
133 See McAllister, supra note 113, at 21 (“In many regulatory programs, states have the primary responsibility for 
enforcement and are overburdened.”); RECHTSCHAFFEN &. MARKELL, supra note 5, at 43 (“Congress established a 
‘cooperative federalism’ structure that makes EPA ultimately responsible for program delivery while reserving the 
primary front lines implementation role for willing and capable states.”). 
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compliance promotion work is now done by the states with oversight from EPA.  According to 
one account, states conduct about ninety percent of all environmental regulatory inspections and 
file eighty to ninety percent of environmental enforcement actions.134  Moreover, the number of 
state enforcement actions may dwarf the level of private enforcement, even under a statute such 
as the CWA in which citizen enforcement historically has been high.135  Thus, assessments of the 
efficacy of state performance are (or to be plausible must be) at the heart of efforts to evaluate 
government enforcement performance more generally.136  
 
 The GAO and EPA’s OIG, among others, have documented significant deficiencies in 
states’ performance.137  Both entities have reported inconsistencies in state environmental 
enforcement, and the OIG characterized state enforcement programs as “underperforming,” 
notwithstanding EPA’s efforts to improve state performance and oversight consistency.138 
 
EPA’s enforcement office also has acknowledged serious deficiencies in state performance.  
In an August 2013 draft strategy to improve oversight of state enforcement, EPA noted that its 
reviews of state performance identified four “unresolved and recurring” significant issues 
concerning state enforcement (or the integration of federal and state enforcement programs) that 
require focused attention: 
 
x Widespread and persistent data inaccuracy and incompleteness in national data systems, 
which make it hard to identify when serious problems exist or to track state actions; 
x Routine failure of states to identify and report significant noncompliance; 
x Routine failure of states to take timely or appropriate enforcement actions to return 
violating facilities to compliance, potentially allowing pollution to continue unabated; 
and  
x Failure of states to take appropriate penalty actions, which results in ineffective 
deterrence for noncompliance and an unlevel playing field for companies that do 
comply.139   
                                                             
134 McAllister, supra note 113, at 21.  See also Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note 59, at 11 (“A 
significant proportion of inspections and enforcement actions are conducted by the states.”). 
135 See Andreen, Motivating Enforcement, supra note 48, at 75-76 (reporting that referrals of enforcement cases to 
state attorneys general significantly outstripped citizen suits filed, even at a time when state enforcement was 
declining). 
136 See Esworthy, How Can They Be Enforced?, supra note 59, at 3 (noting that given states’ substantial role under 
federal pollution statutes, “state autonomy versus the extent of federal oversight is often at the center of debate with 
regard to environmental enforcement”). 
137 See, e.g., id. at 2 n. 5 (collecting sources); U.S. EPA, Office of Inspector General, EPA Must Improve Oversight 
of State Enforcement, http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/202/20111209-12-P-0113.pdf (2011) [hereinafter OIG, 
Improve Oversight]; Memorandum from Robert Perciasepe and Cynthia Giles to Arthur Elkins, Inspector General, 
Inspector General's (OIG) December 9, 2011 Evaluation Report, Project No. OPE-FYl0-0022, “EPA Must Improve 
Oversight of State Enforcement” (March 12, 2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2012/12-P-0113-
Agency_Response.pdf; CWAP, supra note 29. 
138 GAO, Strategic Plan, supra note 127, at 1-2. 
139 EPA, National Strategy for Improving Oversight of State Enforcement Performance 4 (Aug. 27, 2013 draft), 
available at http://environblog.jenner.com/files/national-strategy-for-improving-oversight-of-state-enforcement-
performance.pdf.  EPA’s reviews, conducted under its State Review Framework (SRF), are available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/state/srf/index.html (2004-2012).  See also EPA, Improving Oversight, supra note 
124, at 11, 15-16 (identifying limited information and inconsistencies in EPA databases concerning state 
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The upshot is that, as EPA’s OIG has found, “state enforcement programs frequently do 
not meet national enforcement goals.”140  The OIG found that during fiscal years 2003 to 2009, 
which was before some of the most significant funding declines described below occurred, 
“performance was low across the board,” with some states performing far below average.141  For 
example, EPA established a national goal that states inspect 100% of major CAA emitters every 
two years, but the Inspector General found that only eight states met that goal.  As of 2009, EPA 
set a national goal that states inspect 100% of CWA major permit holders every two years, but in 
2010, only two states met that goal, the national average was only 61%, and 13 states inspected 
fewer than 50% of major facilities.142  Similarly, only two states met EPA’s target for inspections 
of hazardous waste generators under RCRA, and states averaged inspections at only 62% of the 
targeted number of facilities.143  The OIG concluded that EPA had failed to hold its regional 
offices accountable for ensuring that states adequately enforce environmental laws, and that EPA 
regions did not consistently intervene to correct state deficiencies.144   
 
Given these challenges, as well as growing federal and state budget pressures, it has 
become increasingly difficult to rely primarily on EPA’s traditional approach of inspecting 
individual entities to increase compliance with the nation’s environmental laws and 
regulations.145  EPA recently announced a new initiative—Next Generation Compliance—to 
improve performance by capitalizing on advances in emissions monitoring and information 
technology.146 
 
B. Declining Resources 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
enforcement and noting EPA’s difficulties in “accurately and consistently tracking the size of the regulated 
populations”). 
140 OIG, Improve Oversight, supra note 137, at 8. 
141 Id. at 8. 
142 Id. at 9. 
143 Id. at 10. 
144 Id. at 11, 15.  Some statutes authorize EPA to withdraw authority for state permitting programs not administered 
in accordance with statutory requirements.  See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (RCRA).  
One of the prerequisites for delegation of permitting authority to the states is adequate state authority to carry out the 
regulatory program, including enforcement requirements.  33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7).  For discussion of EPA’s exercise 
of that authority, see generally Hammond & Markell, supra note 5. 
Statistics such as the number of enforcement actions brought or the amount of penalty dollars recovered in 
enforcement actions do not necessarily correlate with either levels of environmental protection achieved or levels of 
compliance.  The need for enforcement action may fall, for example, if earlier steps in the regulatory process have 
succeeded in making compliance easier and motivating regulated entities to comply.  Nevertheless, EPA has 
acknowledged problems in some states’ enforcement records and in EPA regional offices’ oversight of these 
programs.  See EPA, Improving Oversight, supra note 125, at 2-3 (“EPA’s current metrics [for state enforcement 
activity] are based on the activities the states perform and not on the level of compliance within regulated sectors, 
which is difficult to assess with the information currently available.”). 
145 GAO, Strategic Plan, supra note 127, at 1-2.  
146 See Giles, supra note 24; infra Parts IIB & III.   The GAO has suggested that EPA develop a “strategic plan to 
integrate Next Generation Compliance into its enforcement and compliance program.”  GAO, Strategic Plan, supra 
note 127, at 8.   EPA is in the process of doing so.  Id. at 9. 
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 The adequacy of government resources to promote compliance has been a long-standing 
concern that seems unlikely to be addressed in the near term.147  Most of EPA’s annual funding 
comes from discretionary appropriations.  The agency’s funds increased sharply in the late 
1970s, as EPA began implementing many of the foundational environmental laws adopted earlier 
that decade.148  Funding dipped in the early 1980s and then leveled off until late in that decade, 
after which it increased fairly regularly until fiscal year 2005.149  The enacted budget for the 
agency fell slightly for fiscal years 2006 through 2009, bringing appropriations approximately 
back to the amounts provided by Congress during the late 1990s.150  Adjusted for inflation, 
EPA’s funding in fiscal year 2009 was slightly lower than it was in fiscal year 1978, according to 
the CRS.151  After reaching a peak of $10.3 billion in fiscal year 2010, the agency’s budget 
declined to about $8.5 billion in fiscal years 2011 and 2012, and a little less in fiscal year 
2013.152  
 
Further cuts, perhaps significant ones, seem almost inevitable, at least in the near term.153  
Environmental group spokespersons have characterized budget cuts for EPA as an indirect way 
to weaken environmental regulations, likening the situation to “death by a thousand cuts.”154  
These cuts are likely to affect the agency’s capacity to fulfill its responsibilities, including its 
enforcement function.  EPA announced in early 2014, for example, that increasing budget 
pressure and resulting uncertainty had prompted it to reduce its workforce through employee 
buyouts.155  EPA’s workforce had already declined between 2004 and 2012 during a period when 
                                                             
147 Barton Thompson noted in 2000 that “the enforcement wings of both federal and state environmental agencies 
are often woefully understaffed and underfunded.”  Thompson, supra note 23, at 191. 
148 EPA’s budget increased from $770 million dollars in fiscal year 1976 to $2.7 billion in fiscal year 1977 to $5.4 
billion in both fiscal years 1978 and 1979.  U.S. EPA, EPA’s Budget and Spending, 
http://www2.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget [hereinafter EPA, Budget].  
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Robert Esworthy et al., Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): Appropriations for FY2013, Congressional 
Research Service Report, at 39 (Sept. 6, 2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42520.pdf 
[hereinafter Esworthy et al., Appropriations]. 
152 EPA, Budget, supra note 147.  EPA received $14.8 million in appropriated funds in fiscal year 2009, but about 
half took the form of emergency supplemental appropriations under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.  Esworthy et al., Appropriations, supra note 151, at 2, 39, 41.  EPA’s 
budget declined by 18% from FY 2010 to FY2012, not counting the additional cuts caused by the sequestration in 
2013.  Coral Davenport, EPA Funding Reductions Have Kneecapped Environmental Enforcement, NAT’L J., Mar. 3, 
2013. 
153 See, e.g., Jean Chemnick & Jason Plautz, Agency takes $300M hit in Obama proposal that cuts budget for 5th 
consecutive year, E&ENEWS, Mar. 4, 2014.  Some past and proposed future cuts seem linked to hostility to EPA’s 
overall mission.  A 2013 House Appropriations Committee press release, for example, explained that legislation 
proposing further budget cuts “reflects significant efforts to rein in the EPA – an agency that has been rife with 
governmental overreach, overspending on ineffective and unnecessary programs, and costly and questionable 
regulations.”  Id.  See also Interior Appropriations Bill Limits EPA, Conservation Spending, Farm Futures (July 24, 
2013), http://farmfutures.com/story-interior-appropriations-bill-limits-epa-conservation-spending-0-100631-spx_1 
(quoting House Appropriations Chairman Hal Rogers) (“In addition, by holding back overly zealous and 
unnecessary environmental regulations, this bill can have a positive effect on our economy and will help encourage 
job growth.”). 
154 Phil Taylor & Jason Plautz, House proposed ‘devastating’ cuts to Interior, EPA accounts in fiscal 2014, ENV’T & 
ENERGY DAILY, May 22, 2013 (quoting Frank O’Donnell of Clean Air Watch). 
155 See Emily Yehle, EPA: Strapped agency prepared hundreds of buyouts in sweeping workforce overhaul, E&E 
NEWS, Jan. 30, 2014, available at http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1059993758 [hereinafter Yehle, 
Strapped].  
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the overall number of federal employees grew by 14 percent.156  Among other things, according 
to a spokesperson for a government employees’ union, the buyouts will result in a reduction in 
the number of enforcement official available to do inspections.157   
 
The impact of a drop in real funding over the years has been magnified by the increase in 
EPA’s regulatory responsibilities resulting from the enactment of new statutory programs (such 
as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act in 1980158 and 
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act in 1986159) and the expansion of 
regulatory programs – often in ways that drew many new sources within the scope  of those 
programs – through amendments to RCRA in 1984,160 the CWA in 1987,161 and the CAA in 
1990.162 
 
The combination of EPA’s declining resource pool and increased responsibilities has 
presented the agency with difficult choices, some of which may impair EPA’s enforcement 
capacity.163  In late 2013, EPA issued a Draft Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2014 to 2018.164  In 
the portion of the Plan devoted to the goal of protecting health and the environment by enforcing 
laws and assuring compliance, EPA trumpeted its commitment to a “new enforcement paradigm” 
under its Next Generation Compliance Initiative.165  EPA predicted that this Initiative would 
                                                             
156 EPA’s permanent career employees fell by 1.1% during this period.  See U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
Federal Workforce: Recent Trends in Federal Civilian Employment and Compensation 14, GAO-14-215 (Jan. 
2014); Emily Yehle, EPA, Interior lost employees even as governmentwide numbers grew, E&E NEWS, Jan. 29, 
2014.  EPA’s peak workforce occurred in fiscal year 1999 and had declined by 5.5% by fiscal year 2012.  See 
Esworthy et al,, Appropriations, supra note 151, at 20 (noting general downward trend in FTEs since FY 2001); 
EPA, Budget, supra note 147.  For graphic depictions of EPA’s budget and full-time equivalent staffing levels over 
time, see U.S. EPA FY 2014 Budget in Brief, at 13, available at 
http://www.radonleaders.org/sites/default/files/EPA_FY_2014.pdf. 
The size of the workforce as a whole does not necessarily tell the complete story.  The GAO has criticized 
EPA for struggling “to identify its human resource needs and to deploy its staff throughout the agency in a manner 
that would do the most good.”  U.S. Government Accountability Office, Environmental Protection Agency, 
Management Challenges and Budget Observations, GAO-12-149T, at 3 (2011).  See also EPA Office of Inspector 
General, EPA Needs Better Agency-Wide Controls over Staff Resources, Report No. 11-P-0136 (Feb. 22, 2011), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2011/20110222-11-P-0136.pdf; EPA Office of Inspector General, EPA 
Needs Workload Data to Better Justify Future Workforce Levels, Report No. 11-P-0639 (Sept. 14, 2011), available 
at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2011/201110914-11-P-0630.pdf. 
157 Yehle, Strapped, supra note 155. 
158 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). 
159 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1729 (1986). 
160 Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3224 (1984). 
161 Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 60 (1987). 
162 Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2468 (1990). 
163 See EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance—Areas of Proposed Budget Adjustment for FY13 
(available through a link in Joel Mintz, Cutting EPA's Enforcement Budget: What It Might Mean (Apr. 12, 2012), 
http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=A6A2E941-98B3-8007-9CEEB42458BED78E).  This 
source indicates that EPA’s Office of Enforcement Compliance and Assurance (OECA) responded to the fiscal year 
2013 budget by proposing “disinvestment” in areas such as acid rain control and reduced enforcement of regulatory 
programs.   
164 Draft FY 2014–2018 EPA Strategic Plan; Availability, 78 Fed. Reg. 69412 (Nov. 19, 2013); Draft FY 2014–
2018 EPA Strategic Plan (Nov. 19, 2013), available at 
http://progressivereform.org/articles/EPA_Draft_Strategic_Plan112013.pdf.  
165 Draft FY 2014-2018 EPA Strategic Plan, supra note 164, at 42.  The Initiative is described further at supra notes 
2, 145 and accompanying text, and infra Part III. 
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enhance enforcement and compliance by relying on innovative enforcement approaches that use 
new monitoring and reporting technologies.166  News reports, however, focused on the portions 
of the draft Plan indicating that EPA would cut federal inspections by one-third and reduce the 
number of civil cases filed each year by 23 percent.167  EPA insisted that its decision to focus on 
the biggest violators and to implement real-time monitoring of emissions to prevent violations 
would enhance compliance.168  The shift in enforcement strategy appeared to have been induced 
at least in part, however, by budgetary pressures, as reflected in the concession by a top EPA 
enforcement official that “[o]bviously, necessarily with budget cuts, we have to make tough 
choices.”169 
   
The decline in resources available to the federal government for environmental protection 
programs generally, and for enforcement functions specifically, is likely to have ripple effects on 
the robustness of state programs.170  The federal government has long provided financial 
assistance in the form of grants and loans to assist the states in performing their roles under the 
federal environmental statutes.  Between fiscal years 2004 and 2012, annual appropriations for 
EPA categorical grants to assist states in implementing air, water, pesticide, and hazardous 
substance programs shrunk by about $85 million.171  The Environmental Council of the States 
(ECOS) has expressed concern about reductions in federal funding for state environmental 
programs.172  Some within the federal government apparently share these concerns.173  
                                                             
166 Draft FY 2014-2018 EPA Strategic Plan, supra note 164, at 42. 
167 Neela Bannerjee, EPA plans to sharply reduce inspections, L.A. TIMES, De. 10 2013, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/10/business/la-fi-epa-enforcement-20131211.   The number of inspections 
conducted and enforcement actions initiated had already fallen in fiscal year 2013.  See EPA, Office of Enforcement 
and Compliance Assurance, Fiscal Year 2013 EPA Enforcement and Compliance Annual Results 5-6 (2013), 
available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-02/documents/fy-2013-enforcement-annual-results-
charts-2-6-14_0.pdf#page=5.  These numbers provoked an environmental group spokesperson to remark:  “They’re 
not doing more with less, they’re doing less with less.”  EPA Urged to Overhaul Enforcement Strategy After FY13 
Results Decrease, INSIDE EPA ENVTL. POLICY ALERT, Feb. 19, 2014, at 32. 
168 See Bannerjee, supra note 167; Emily Yehle, Agency plans to drastically scale back enforcement, E&E NEWS, 
Dec. 9, 2013, available at http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1059991523 [hereinafter Yehles, Scale back] 
(referring to EPA’s intent to focus on work “that makes the biggest difference”).  See also Anthony Adragna, 
Enforcement Cuts, Lack of Detail on Climate Lead Concerns About EPA Strategic Plan, 45 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 110 
(Jan. 8. 2014) (reporting claim that the Next Generation Compliance Program would create a more efficient and 
targeted enforcement program); Jessica Coomes, EPA Enforcement Cases Drop 20 Percent After Decision to 
Prioritize ‘Larger’ Cases, 45 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 452 (Feb. 7 2014) (reporting EPA’s intent “to pursue larger, more 
complex, risk-based enforcement cases leading to significant environmental and health gains”). 
169 Yehle, Scale back, supra note 168. 
170 See, e.g., Will Reisinger, Trent A. Dougherty & Nolan Moser, Environmental Enforcement and the Limits of 
Cooperative Federalism: Will Courts Allow Citizen Suits to Pick up the Slack?, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 
21 (2010) (“The cooperative model also makes the enforcement of national environmental objectives subject to 
budget cuts and shortfalls in each individual state, which further threatens the effectiveness of cooperative 
federalism.”). 
171 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Funding for 10 States’ Programs Supported by Environmental 
Protection Agency Categorical Grants, GAO-13-504R, at 1 (May 6, 2013), http://www.gao.gov/products/gao-13-
504r [hereinafter GAO, Funding for 10].  Appropriations for all EPA categorical grants decreased from a $1.17 
billion in fiscal year 2004 to $1.09 billion in fiscal year 2012.  Id. at 4.  For a graph plotting the amounts provided 
during this period, see id. at 5. 
172 Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note 59, at 4 (citing ECOS, March 2008 Green Report: State 
Environmental Expenditures 2005-2008, March 12, 2008, available at http://www.ecos.org/section/states/spending). 
173 Id. at 4 (noting that the “the level of federal funding allocated to state and tribes to support effective enforcement 
of federal pollution control laws has . . . been a long-standing congressional concern”).  It is often difficult to follow 
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The reductions in federal financial support for the states were especially problematic 
given that many states were cutting funds for their own agencies and enforcement programs at 
the same time.  ECOS concluded in 2009 and 2010 that reductions in state budgets for 
environmental enforcement threatened the viability of state enforcement programs.174  Between 
fiscal years 2011 and 2012, 24 states reduced funding for their environmental agencies,175 
reflecting “an overall trend of decreasing budgets” for funding for state environmental agencies 
and, according to ECOS, “jeopardiz[ing] states’ ability to implement federally delegated 
programs and policies.”176  The CRS expressed concern about a mismatch between federal 
support provided and state needs, noting that “[t]he adequacy of federal funds to assist states 
with these responsibilities has become a more contentious issue over time, as state revenues and 
spending generally have declined under recent economic conditions.”177  The GAO similarly 
noted that “the importance of federal grants has increased, as some states have reduced their 
funding for certain environmental programs to address decreased state revenues and significant 
deficits in funding.”178 
 
Some states responded to reduced funding for environmental programs by reducing staff 
levels and cutting outreach and technical assistance programs that can facilitate compliance.179  
State environmental officials have reported to the GAO that resource constraints have required 
them to institute hiring freezes and reduce staff through attrition and layoffs.  In addition, these 
officials reported that funding freezes or declines have affected their capacity to conduct 
activities such as permitting, inspections, and monitoring, all of which are critical to effective 
enforcement.180 
 
All of this is to say that implementation of environmental enforcement programs does not 
occur in a static world.  Rather, both the responsibilities and capacities of regulators shift over 
time.  Particularly when growing responsibilities, such as those described in the next section, 
accompany shrinking resources, policymakers engaged in regulatory design should be cognizant 
of and account for those realities. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
the money trail, given that “[d]etailed reporting of federal funding to states and states’ funding contributions for 
pollution control enforcement/compliance activities is not readily available.”  Id. at 39. 
174 Id. at 4 (citing ECOS, Status of State Environmental Agency Budgets, 2009-2011, August 2010; ECOS, Impacts 
of Reductions in FY 2010 on State Environmental Agency Budgets, March 2010; ECOS, Funding Environmental 
Protection: State Budget Shortfalls and Ideas for Mitigating Them (June 2009), 
http://www.ecos.org/section/publications). 
175 ECOS Green Report - Status of State Environmental Agency Budgets, 2011-2013, at 1 (Sept. 2012), 
http://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/41680992/September%202012%20Green%20Report.pdf.  The 24 states with 
decreasing budgets experienced larger changes than the 25 states with increasing budgets, and the total decline in 
state environmental agency budgets from FY2011 to FY2012 averaged $357,015 per state.  Id. 
176 Id. at 2, 5. 
177 Esworthy et al., Appropriations, supra note 151, at 1. 
178 GAO, Funding for 10, supra note 172, at 1. 
179 Id. at 4, 9.  On the potential value of technical assistance and outreach by regulators, see Carol Foley & Michael 
Elliott, Systems Design and the Promotion of Pollution Prevention: Building More Effective Technical Assistance 
Programs, 29 GA. L. REV. 449 (1995). 
180 GAO, Funding for 10, supra note 171, at 4, 9-10.  
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C. Changes in the Regulated Community and Regulator Responsibilities and 
Capacities: The Dynamic Character of Regulation 
 
 At the same time as resources available to agencies to enforce environmental laws have 
diminished, challenges facing enforcement officials have shifted.  Among the factors that have 
made effective enforcement more daunting for some agencies and programs are an increase in 
the number of regulated entities; increases in regulatory responsibilities and mandates for 
agencies and regulated entities alike; implementation of programs that depend on making 
difficult causal connections between regulated activities and environmental harms; a movement 
in some contexts away from uniform regulatory treatment toward differentiated responsibility, 
which may arise under market-based approaches to regulation or other deviations from 
traditional regulatory tools; and a commitment to target significant violations by smaller sources 
that have not traditionally been the focus of enforcement attention and activity.181 
 
For various reasons, contemporary government enforcement officials would face 
significant challenges in achieving effective enforcement of environmental laws even if the 
financial resources available for enforcement were not declining.  In some instances, the size of 
the regulated community has grown.182  EPA has referred to the “breadth and expanding scope of 
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) regulated universe” as one of the 
challenges it faces in improving its enforcement performance.183  The number of point sources 
subject to CWA permitting requirements doubled over a recent ten-year period.184  A recent 
appellate court decision established, for example, that pesticide applications that allow chemical 
residues to enter surface water bodies may trigger regulation under that statute.185  Stormwater 
permitting has also increased the size of the regulated community.186   
 
The resulting increase in regulated entities may present difficulties for federal and state 
regulators.187  In New York, for example, regulated point sources increased by 63% between 
                                                             
181 Esworthy et al., Appropriations, supra note 151, at 4 (noting that funding for enforcement “had not kept pace 
with the increasing number of mandates and regulations, or with inflation”). 
182 See, e.g., Bruce Harper, Trust But Verify: Innovation in Compliance Monitoring as a Response to the 
Privatization of Utilities in Developed Nations, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 614 (1996) (“An increase in the number of 
generators alone holds some potential to make environmental enforcement more difficult.”). 
183 CWAP, supra note 29, at 10. 
184 McAllister, supra note 113 at 21-22.  For further discussion of the expansion of regulated sources under the Act, 
see infra notes 222-28 and accompanying text (discussion of EPA’s CWAP). 
185 See National Cotton Council of Am. v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009). 
186 See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Office of Inspector General, Limited Knowledge of the Universe of Regulated Entities 
Impedes EPA’s Ability to Demonstrate Changes in Regulatory Compliance, Report No. 2005-P-00024, at 7 (Sept. 
19, 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2005/20050919-2005-P-00024.pdf (identifying 45% increase 
in sources requiring CWA stormwater permits between 2001 and 2005).  During the same period, the number of 
manufacturers covered by the Toxic Substances Control Act increased by 61%.  Id.  Likewise, discharges from 
expanding hydraulic fracturing activities may trigger CWA requirements.  See Robin Kundis Craig, Hydraulic 
Fracturing (Fracking), Federalism, and the Water-Energy Nexus, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 241, 249 (2013). 
187 See Kara Cook, Note, The Middle Ground of Pesticide Regulation: Why EPA Should Use a Watershed-Based 
Permitting Scheme in Its New Aquatic Pesticides Rule, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 451, 486 (2010) (“There are significant 
monitoring and enforcement challenges because of the sudden explosion in permitting applicants.”). 
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1999 and 2012.188  In some contexts, it may be possible to reduce the burdens of addressing 
newly expanded categories of regulated sources through the creation of general permits, such as 
the ones available under the CWA’s dredge and fill189 and NPDES190 permit programs.  Indeed, 
EPA has developed a general permit for pesticide and herbicide applications over surface 
waters.191  General permits undoubtedly reduce the resource commitment a state must make at 
the permit approval stage, but agencies continue to have ongoing responsibility for monitoring, 
oversight of reporting, and inspections.192  If agencies seek to reduce their administrative burdens 
by not only switching from source-specific to general permitting, but also by minimizing 
oversight of sources covered by general permits through reduced inspections or sporadic review 
of regulated entities’ reports, one trade-off will be a decline in verifiability and accountability.193   
 
Changes in the nature of regulatory approaches also may complicate agency performance 
of enforcement and compliance-related functions.  For example, EPA has recently shifted its 
focus in implementing the CWA from enforcement of technology-based effluent limitations 
applicable to point sources to achieving state water quality standards through the implementation 
of ambient quality-based effluent limitations.194  Water quality standards are often expressed in 
terms of maximum ambient concentrations of pollutants in a surface water body, but are 
sometimes couched in narrative terms.  Implementation of such a standard requires a state 
environmental agency to establish a total maximum daily load (TMDL), which is an aggregate 
amount of pollution that may be discharged into a surface water body without resulting in 
concentrations of regulated pollutants in excess of those allowed by a state water quality 
standard.195  Establishing enforceable limits, monitoring whether allowed loadings (clearly 
                                                             
188 Environmental Advocates of New York, Turning a Blind Eye to Illegal Pollution: DEC’s Failing Record on 
Enforcing Environmental Laws 8 (Sept. 2013), http://www.eany.org/our-work/reports/turning-blind-eye-illegal-
pollution-september-2013. 
189 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e). 
190 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a); California Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., 728 F.3d 868 
(9th Cir. 2013) (involving California’s Industrial Activities Storm Water General Permit).  See generally Jeffrey M. 
Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 413 
(2007). 
191 See, e.g., Final National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Pesticide General Permit for Point 
Source Discharges From the Application of Pesticides, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,750 (Nov. 7, 2011). 
192 See, e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,775 (listing among Pesticide General Permit requirements the duties of applicators to 
monitor adverse incidents and document visual monitoring activities).  General NPDES permits may regulate one or 
more discharge categories, provided all sources within a category are subject to the same or similar monitoring 
requirements.  40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(2)(ii)(D). 
193 Efforts to enforce against private landowners, small businesses, or sectors of the business community (such as 
agriculture) that traditionally have not been enforcement targets also may pose new challenges, such as increased 
political opposition.  Federal efforts to enforce wetlands permitting requirements under the CWA, for example, have 
generated political opposition and adverse publicity.  See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Wetlands? What Wetlands?, 
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/20/wetlands-what-wetlands/?_r=0 (Apr. 20, 2011) (describing Sackett v. 
EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012), a CWA enforcement action to block construction of a single family home on property 
alleged to contain regulated wetlands, as an example of the view of libertarians and tea party members that EPA is 
the “embodiment of government run amok”). 
194 See, e.g., ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 614 (6th ed. Aspen 
Pub. 2011) (noting increase in the role of water quality standards). 
195 Upper Blackstone Water Pollution Abatement Dist. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 9, 14 n.8 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(d)(1)(C)) (“A TMDL is a calculation of the maximum quantity of a pollutant that may be added to a water 
body from all sources without exceeding applicable water quality standards, including ‘a margin of safety which 
takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent limitations and water 
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enforceable or less so) are producing desired environmental results, and adapting to the findings 
are all resource-intensive enterprises, perhaps especially if the target is a vague narrative 
standard rather than a numerical target.196  Determining whether a point source violated 
technology-based effluent limits, which are expressed as caps on end-of-pipe discharges, is a 
relatively simple matter by comparison.  Agency efforts to improve water quality by restoring 
and maintaining ecologically functioning ecosystems will likely create similar ripple effects on 
enforcement strategies.197  Expansion of the CWA permit program to cover stormwater 
permitting may make regulators’ enforcement tasks more difficult because regulation of 
stormwater discharges often takes the form of best management practices rather than end-of-pipe 
discharge limits.198  It may be harder to track compliance status with mandates that take the form 
of ongoing operating practices than it is for numerical discharge limits that can be monitored.199  
As regulatory challenges change, so do enforcement challenges, affecting the implications of 
available regulatory design options. 
 
Shifting from traditional regulatory techniques such as technology-based limits that apply 
to classes of regulated sources to market-based strategies that allow individual regulated entities 
to alter their responsibilities through inter-source transactions is another change in regulatory 
approach that is likely to create new enforcement challenges.200  Such a shift may make it more 
difficult to ascertain the nature and extent of enforceable duties of individual regulated 
entities.201  Some emissions trading markets have been exploited through the sale of credits for 
environmental improvements that would have occurred even without regulation, credits for 
which sellers have already been fully paid either in the same or another market, or credits that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
quality’”).  The focus on enforcement of TMDLs is largely the result of citizen suits resulting in court decrees 
requiring the establishment of delinquent TMDLs.  This example illustrates the need for policymakers engaged in 
regulatory design to consider how one aspect of a regulatory program (such as the availability of citizen 
enforcement) may affect other such aspects (such as the task of regulators to translate TMDLs into source-specific 
effluent limitations). 
196 The regulatory and non-regulatory enterprise of seeking to bring an impaired water up to a desired state is 
complex.  Cf. Sarah Birkeland, EPA’s TMDL Program, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 297, 300 (2001) (referring to “the 
implementation and enforcement challenges faced by the EPA’s TMDL program”). 
197 GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 194, at 550 (describing new objectives geared toward restoration and maintenance 
of functioning ecosystems and toward control of nonpoint source pollution). 
198 See. e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envt. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338 (2013). 
199 See Robert L. Fischman & Jeffrey B. Hyman, The Legal Challenge of Protecting Animal Migrations as 
Phenomena of Abundance, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 223 (2010) (“BMPs are harder to monitor and enforce than 
traditional technology-based limitations because the BMPs are more widely dispersed across the landscape.”). 
200 U.S. environmental law has long been criticized for excessive reliance on traditional regulatory techniques such 
as uniform technology-based standards applicable to source categories.  The critics contend that such approaches are 
inefficient because they fail to recognize differences among sources in the costs of controlling pollution.  See, e.g., 
Bruce Ackerman & Richard Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985).  Policymakers 
have responded by incorporating market-based mechanisms such as tradeable permits into statutes such as the CAA.  
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §7651b(b) (allowing transfers of allowances for regulated utilities to emit sulfur dioxide that 
contributes to acid rain). 
201 See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn from 
Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 39 (2006) (“[I]t is easier to keep track of a uniform technology than to police 
facility-specific pollution reduction strategies.  Second generation strategies encourage differentiation.  They 
accordingly offer less in the way of strict accountability and enforceability and open the door to bad-faith attempts 
to game the system.”). 
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did not occur at all except on paper.202  Colorado noted that the burden on agencies to improve 
compliance may increase when requirements are tailored rather than consistent across an 
industry, not only because it will be more difficult for government inspectors to determine 
compliance, but also because “it may be more difficult to implement a self-certification program 
where individualized permits determine unique facility-specific compliance requirements.”203 
 
A final development that may increase the difficulty of enforcement is the effort to 
address significant environmental threats, even from sources that have not traditionally been the 
focus of agency enforcement attention, and to address sources that are emitting or discharging 
relatively small amounts, but whose violations may be cumulatively significant.204  If 
enforcement initiatives target smaller sources, enforcers may have to initiate more actions and 
commit more resources to enforcement just to achieve the same level of environmental 
improvement through enhanced compliance.205  In addition, data relevant to compliance status 
may not be available to the same extent for small as for larger sources, making it more difficult 
to enforce against those sources, or at least more expensive as agencies must amass a data base 
that does not exist or is incomplete.206   
 
Changes in regulatory challenges are not entirely in the direction of making government 
officials’ jobs more difficult.  There are also opportunities to promote compliance that may 
facilitate better performance.   As Part III below indicates, these include improvements in 
monitoring capacity and enhancements in the capacity to manage and disseminate data and other 
information.  Improved understanding of the mix of incentives that promote compliance also 
holds promise for improving the effectiveness of enforcement efforts.207 
 
D. A Brief Conclusion Concerning the Importance of Context to Regulatory Design 
  
                                                             
202 See Philip Womble & Martin Doyle, The Geography of Trading Ecosystem Services: A Case Study of Wetland 
and Stream Compensatory Mitigation Markets, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 229, 291-92 (2012).  For descriptions of 
exploitations of environmental regulatory markets, see Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and 
Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231 
(1999); Elisabeth Rosenthal & Andrew W. Lehren, Profits on Carbon Credits Drive Output of a Harmful Gas, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/world/asia/incentive-to-slow-climate-change-drives-
output-of-harmful-gases.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  See also Nicklas A. Akers, New Tools for Environmental 
Justice: Articulating a Net Health Effects Challenge to Emissions Trading Markets, 7 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 203 (2001). 
203 Schieffelin, supra note 15, at 18. 
204 Cf. U.S. EPA, Office of Inspector General, Limited Knowledge of the Universe of Regulated Entities Impedes 
EPA’s Ability to Demonstrate Changes in Regulatory Compliance, Report No. 2005-P-00024, at 14 (Sept. 19, 2005), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2005/20050919-2005-P-00024.pdf [hereinafter OIG, Limited 
Knowledge] (reporting that, in multiple program areas, “OECA does not know the cumulative effects of pollution 
from small entities”).  The OIG also reported that “some states and EPA regions have argued that RCRA small 
quantity generator facility inspections represent some of the most environmentally significant activities that regions 
and States conduct.”  Id.  See also infra Part III. 
205 Cf. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age of Collaboration, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 555, 560 
(“The remaining non-compliance cases often involve either smaller targets or more difficult problems of proof, 
making them costlier and riskier to litigate.”). 
206 See, e.g., OIG, Limited Knowledge, supra note 204, at 8 (discussing absence of reliable data on programs such as 
CAA regulation of minor stationary sources and regulation of small quantity generators under RCRA). 
207 See infra Part III. 
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 Part I seeks to demonstrate that policymakers designing or redesigning programs dealing 
with regulatory enforcement and compliance promotion should be aware that the programs 
operate in a multi-faceted context in which each part of the regulatory process may affect the 
degree to which other parts are capable of achieving the goal of effective regulation.  Further, it 
highlights several contextual issues (such as the hybrid character of contemporary governance) 
that deserve close attention.  This Part has focused on two contextual issues as they apply to EPA 
in particular.  The first is the agency’s enforcement performance record and the impact on it of 
the resource challenges it has faced and continues to face.  The second is the dynamic nature of 
regulation.  Even if one were to take a snapshot of the regulatory process and fully assimilate the 
interactions among the different phases of the regulatory process and actors participating in it, 
that understanding is of time-limited value.  Past experience with a regulatory program can and 
should provide lessons that shape policymakers’ redesign efforts.  Just as important, however, is 
recognition that the regulatory landscape and the role of its participants changes, sometimes in 
ways that significantly disrupt settled patterns.  If policymakers assume a certain level of state 
and private enforcement in structuring EPA’s own enforcement activities, they may find that the 
aggregate level of enforcement is not what they anticipated or desired if, for example, state 
funding of enforcement drops significantly.  The same might be true if the Supreme Court were 
to issue a decision sharply restricting standing for environmental NGOs in citizen suits.208  The 
overarching point is that regulatory design needs to be undertaken, and revisited over time, with 
a sophisticated understanding of the nature of the regulatory landscape that exists in a particular 
regulatory setting and of the changes in this landscape that are likely to occur over time. 
 
III. A Review of EPA’s Initiative to “Transform” Compliance and Enforcement under the 
Clean Water Act209 
In this Part we provide a case study of an ongoing EPA regulatory redesign effort that 
EPA has recently undertaken to bolster compliance promotion strategies under the CWA.  We 
examine EPA’s approach in the context of the holistic, contextual depiction of the enforcement 
and compliance promotion function outlined above.  In doing so, we are mindful of the view 
some scholars have taken, which we have considered throughout the article, that rationalizing 
public and private enforcement is a central challenge in the modern regulatory state.210  The 
absence of this consideration from EPA’s reinvention effort, despite EPA’s possession of agency 
gatekeeping authority and the significant level of private enforcer activity, raises important 
                                                             
208 After the Supreme Court decided Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), Professor Sunstein opined 
that “[r]ead for all it is worth,” the decision invalidates statutes in which Congress uses citizen suits to control 
“unlawfully inadequate enforcement of the law.”  Cass Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan: Of Citizen Suits, 
“Injuries,” and Article III, 93 MICH. L. REV.  163, 168 (1992).  Had Sunstein’s expansive reading of the case been 
adopted by the courts after Lujan, one leg of the three-legged enforcement stool (the federal government, the states, 
and private citizens) would have been severely impaired.  This example shows that yet another actor has the 
potential to affect operation of enforcement programs, including components designed to rationalize public and 
private enforcement – the federal courts, who act as “gatekeepers” of their own through the application of standing 
and other justiciability doctrines. 
209 Transform is EPA’s word.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Administrator Jackson on Improving Water Quality 
Transparency and Effective Enforcement of Clean Water Act Requirements (July 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/data/results/performance/cwa/jackson-ltr-cwa-enf.html. 
210 E.g., Engstrom, supra note 3. 
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questions for conceptualizing and implementing strategies for enhancing enforcement and 
compliance promotion.211 
Over the past few years, EPA has acknowledged that its strategies for promoting 
compliance with the CWA need improvement.212  In a July 2009 Memorandum, EPA 
Administrator Lisa Jackson told the head of EPA’s enforcement program, Cynthia Giles, that 
“[w]e are . . . falling short [in] the effectiveness of our clean water enforcement programs,”213 
and “the level of significant non-compliance with permitting requirements is unacceptably high . 
. . .”214  Jackson accordingly directed Giles to develop an action plan to improve enforcement 
performance. 
In October 2009, EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assistance (OECA) 
issued the Agency’s Clean Water Action Plan.215  Echoing the Administrator’s concerns, OECA 
noted that “[v]iolations are . . . too widespread, and enforcement too uneven.”216  OECA also 
emphasized the challenge presented by a substantially increased universe of regulated parties:  
“[t]he sheer magnitude of the expanding universe of the NPDES program itself, from roughly 
100,000 . . . sources to nearly a million sources . . . presents challenges in how we regulate and 
enforce the laws. . . .”217  EPA noted that the types of sources known to raise concerns has 
evolved as well:  when EPA developed its enforcement policies, it focused primarily on the 
largest (or major) facilities with individual permits that are in significant noncompliance.  But 
                                                             
211 Our intent here is not to criticize EPA’s reinvention effort for its failure to address private enforcement, nor to 
criticize academic work highlighting the potential value of such enforcement in some contexts.  EPA’s neglect of the 
topic may stem from its limited ability to control citizen enforcement initiatives or informational and coordination 
challenges, among other things.  See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as 
the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 412-413, 428-445, 459-466 (1999-2000) 
(expressing skepticism about government collaboration with private enforcers).  The agency may block citizen suits 
by commencing and diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action against the target of a potential citizen suit 
within 60 days of being notified of a private enforcer’s intention to initiate suit.  33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1).    
212 Concerns pre-dated this latest EPA call for improvements.  See Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra 
note 1; RECHTSHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 5.  Efforts to enhance compliance have tended to focused on permit 
requirements for sources discharging pollutants to surface waters.  One of EPA’s primary strategies is enforcement 
litigation against parties operating in “significant non-compliance” with permit obligations.  See, e.g., EPA Office of 
Compliance and Enforcement Assurance, EPA's Interim Significant Noncompliance Policy for Clean Water Act 
Violations Associated with CSOs, SSOs, CAFOs, and Storm Water Point Sources (Oct. 2007), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/state/srf/sncpolicy-attach1.pdf. 
213 Memorandum from Administrator Jackson on Improving Water Quality Transparency and Effective Enforcement 
of Clean Water Act Requirements (July 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/data/results/performance/cwa/jackson-ltr-cwa-enf.html.  See also CWAP, supra 
note 29, at 2 (“Unfortunately, data shows us that we are not getting the compliance envisioned by our laws to protect 
clean water.”); id. at 3 (“State enforcement response to serious violations, whether at large or smaller facilities, is 
not what it should be.”).  The memo adds that: 1) traditionally EPA has focused on “major” facilities; 2) it has not 
required states to submit data about smaller facilities; and 3) therefore, EPA does not know the percentage of smaller 
sources nationally that are in significant compliance.  But for the 28 states, 4 territories, and D.C. which have 
provided some of these data, the rate of significant noncompliance at smaller facilities is around 45 percent, nearly 
twice the rate for major facilities.  The Plan concludes that EPA and states need consistent data to “formulate 
appropriate strategies for ensuring compliance from these facilities, and to target enforcement resources to the 
sources most affecting water quality.”  Id. at 3. 
214 Memorandum from Administrator Jackson, supra note 213. 
215 CWAP, supra note 29. 
216 Id. at Executive Summary. 
217 Id. at 1, 12 (noting that EPA’s CWA program has “expanded its regulated universe more than tenfold”). 
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EPA had found a rate of serious noncompliance at about 45 percent of smaller facilities.218  EPA 
had further concluded that “[i]t is likely that these smaller but more numerous sources are of 
critical concern, especially where there are clusters of permitted facilities around impaired 
waters.”219  OECA stated that EPA needed to “revamp” enforcement to meet these challenges.220   
 
Based on its own assessment, and considerable outreach,221 OECA identified “three 
major themes for action” to improve compliance, noting that its outreach efforts engendered a 
“surprising coalescence” around these themes.222  The three themes, discussed below, are the 
need to focus on the most significant threats to water quality and public health, to strengthen 
EPA-state partnerships and improve the performance of each partner, and to improve 
accountability and transparency. 
 
A. The Need to Focus Enforcement on the Most Significant Threats 
The first theme for action identified in the CWAP is the need to focus enforcement on the 
“biggest threats to water quality and public health.”223  This strategy (or approach to regulatory 
design) might seem obvious.  But as EPA pointed out, an unintended consequence of EPA’s 
traditional focus on the biggest facilities (known in EPA parlance as “majors”) was that EPA 
paid little attention to the “full range of the NPDES regulated universe,”224 including “non-
major” sources whose discharges caused significant environmental problems.  Thus, EPA’s first 
theme seeks to prioritize enforcement-related efforts by ensuring that these efforts focus on the 
most problematic sources regardless of size, which previously it had not done. 
EPA identified a range of “new approaches and new tools” to address its proposed shift 
in strategy.225  For example, it noted the need to improve data management to facilitate 
                                                             
218 Id. at 3. 
219 Id.  EPA acknowledged in the CWAP that, “[w]ithout complete and accurate data, it is hard to know how critical 
the noncompliance at smaller facilities is to water quality.”  Professor Dick Pierce recognized decades ago that 
“[s]mall firms do not produce disproportionate quantities of social ‘goods.’  They do produce massively 
disproportionate quantities of social ‘bads.’”  Pierce, supra note 2, at 539.  See also id. at 557 (noting that “small 
firms account for a disproportionate quantity of the social bads that we attempt to reduce through regulation”); id. at 
559 (“Small firms also are responsible for a massively disproportionate share of water and air pollution.”).  Pierce 
addressed small firms, not necessarily small facilities, but EPA’s assessment in the CWAP indicates that similar 
conclusions may apply to small sources, especially when assessing the aggregate impacts of their discharges. 
220CWAP, supra note 29, at Executive Summary, 5.  EPA noted that some water quality problems are caused by 
sources not currently being regulated.  Id. at 6.  Given our focus on regulatory design, not substantive regulatory 
content, we do not address the need to revisit the scope of regulatory schemes (such as by covering nonpoint sources 
currently exempt from most CWA regulation).   
221 Outreach included solicitation of input from academics, industry, and environmental and environmental justice 
NGOs.  Id. at 5. 
222 Id. at 6.  EPA has followed through since 2009.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Cynthia Giles & Peter Silva on 
Interim Guidance to Strengthen Performance in the NPDES Program (June 22, 2010), available at 
http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/interim-guidance-strengthen-performance-npdes-program.  See also U.S. EPA, 
OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, CWA ACTION PLAN IMPLEMENTATION PRIORITIES: 
CHANGES TO IMPROVE WATER QUALITY, INCREASE COMPLIANCE AND EXPAND TRANSPARENCY (2011) [hereinafter 
INCREASED COMPLIANCE], available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/civil/programs/cwa/actionplan-implpriorities.pdf. 
223 CWAP, supra note 29, at 6. 
224 Id.   
225 Id. at 7.   EPA discussed several new tools in a 2011 memorandum, INCREASED COMPLIANCE, supra note ___. 
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understanding the relationship between compliance problems and their impacts on water 
quality.226  Data about water quality, permit limits, and permit violations “reside in different 
systems and have not been routinely used together to help target serious problems.”227  EPA also 
highlighted the importance of improving tools across the spectrum of regulation, indicating that 
while responses might include enforcement actions, addressing water quality concerns also might 
require fixing problematic regulations and improving operating permits.228  Last, the agency 
focused on integrating its “state partners” better in its discussion about options for addressing the 
“biggest threats.”229 
In short, EPA’s strategy in addressing the first significant deficiency it identified in extant 
compliance promotion efforts involved all four of the contextual design issues we identified 
above.  EPA’s goal of better integrating states into its enforcement initiatives reflects the hybrid 
nature of the regulatory process (our first conceptual design challenge).  The agency’s decision 
to refocus its efforts stemmed from the “reality check” provided by past experience (our second 
contextual design challenge), which showed that historically EPA had paid insufficient attention 
to significant violators by focusing on a small subset of the regulated party universe.  EPA’s 
commitment to take advantage of improved technology to make easily accessible and 
understandable information available to the public about compliance status, actions EPA and 
states are taking to address problems, and the effects of those actions on water quality relates to 
our third contextual design challenge (dynamism).230  And, finally, EPA’s decision to shift its 
priorities reflects an agency effort to grapple with our fourth design issue (salience).  Further, by 
focusing on resolving data deficiencies (verifiability) and tools besides formal enforcement (the 
available mix of rewards and sanctions), EPA considered some of the key components of an 
effective enforcement and compliance program identified in Part IA; the Agency also recognized 
the inter-related character of these components, noting, for example, that improved verifiability 
and better use of sanctions are related. 
B. Strengthening the State/EPA Partnership 
The second “major theme for action” that EPA identified in its CWAP, not entirely 
distinct from the first, is the need to strengthen state performance.  In most parts of the country, 
states are the first line of CWA permitting and enforcement.231  The Plan noted that reviews of 
                                                             
226 Id. (noting that “[o]nce we have identified significant point source violations across the spectrum of regulated 
facilities that adversely affect water quality, we will work with state programs to commence appropriate federal and 
state civil and criminal enforcement actions”). 
227 Id.  
228 Id. 
229 Id.  For example, OECA has indicated its’ receptivity to allowing states to scale back inspections and monitoring 
at large facilities to free up resources for more intensive scrutiny at smaller facilities, where compliance rates are 
lower.  Reflecting the complexity of the cooperative federalism approach, however, another recent report indicates 
that while states are ready to refocus their efforts, some EPA regional offices have expressed less willingness to 
allow shifts in enforcement-related resources from large facilities to higher priority smaller ones.  See EPA Plan for 
Flexible Compliance Monitoring May Fall Short of States’ Goal, ENVTL. POLICY ALERT/INSIDE EPA (Oct. 2, 2013), 
at 33 (noting that  “some state officials said EPA regional officials do not appear open to . . . scaling back resource-
intensive inspections at large facilities with typically good compliance records in exchange for more inspections at 
smaller, less-reviewed plants”).  This divergence in view stems from the hybrid nature of the regulatory process 
(which entails both federal and state enforcement). 
230 CWAP, supra note 29, at 7. 
231 Forty-six states are currently authorized to implement the NPDES program.  Id. at 8. 
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state performance identified widespread deficiencies, and EPA noted the importance of federal 
oversight to motivate improvements in such performance:  
[The many reviews of state permitting and enforcement performance] have identified a 
lack of consistency in performance across states and highlighted common issues such as 
permit backlogs, failure to identify significant noncompliance, or to take timely and 
appropriate enforcement.  EPA must consistently respond to these issues and press states 
and ourselves to make the appropriate improvements in order to achieve equitable 
protection to the public, a level playing field for competing businesses, and fairness 
across states in how our environmental laws are enforced.232 
EPA’s goal of better integration of federal and state enforcement involves the first of our 
contextual design challenges – the idea that design efforts should take into account the role of 
different stakeholders in a hybrid regulatory process.  Particularly in the cooperative federalism 
context built into the environmental statutes, it is unsurprising that EPA would make 
rationalization of its relationship with the states a top priority.233  EPA enforcement leaders over 
the past couple of decades have highlighted the importance of the state-federal partnership in 
effective enforcement and compliance promotion.234 
EPA’s focus in the CWAP on rationalizing federal and state enforcement efforts reflects 
more than just our point about the importance of hybrid governance considerations to regulatory 
design.  EPA’s concerns extend to several of the key elements of effective enforcement and 
compliance promotion we discuss above, including verifiability and the appropriate mix of 
rewards and sanctions.  The fact that EPA decided to so directly and publicly level its criticisms 
of state performance implicates legitimacy concerns, another important element of effective 
regulation.  EPA’s decision to pursue improved enforcement in light of unacceptable past 
performance reflects the importance of the “contextual design” issue of structuring future efforts 
in light of assessments of past performance.  The agency’s apparent decision to regard 
rationalization of federal and state enforcement as a higher priority than the rationalization of 
public and private enforcement implicates another of our contextual design issues (salience).235  
                                                             
232 Id.  These concerns are not new.  One observer rendered this assessment 20 years ago:  “Enforcement of 
environmental laws by the EPA and the authorized states, however, has largely been an uncoordinated, piecemeal 
effort.  Individual EPA offices and their state counterparts have generally functioned independently. . . . The 
insularity of the EPA’s separate offices and their state-level counterparts has at times resulted in duplicate and 
conflicting actions.”  Peter J. Fontaine, EPA’s Multimideia Enforcement Strategy: The Struggle to Close the 
Environmental Compliance Circle, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 34 (1993).  For book-length treatment, see 
RECHTSHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 5.  See also Markell, Slack, supra note 47, at 8-10.  For a recent review of 
an innovative process intended to empower citizens to raise such concerns administratively, see Hammond & 
Markell, supra note 5. 
233 See, e.g., Hari Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the Obama Administration, 
62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 285 (2011) (discussing cooperative federalism’s potential to “create coordinated multiscalar 
action in which each actor provides its unique contribution”); Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and 
Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 195 (2005) (referring to coordination between federal and state 
entities as “an irreducible aspect” of cooperative federalism).   
234 RECHTSHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 5.    
235 It is not clear from the CWAP whether EPA actually considered the role of private enforcement at all in this 
particular redesign effort.  The Plan makes no reference to the appropriate role of private enforcers or to how they 
impact public enforcement or desired levels of compliance. 
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Thus, EPA’s goal of strengthening state performance bears on several elements of our conceptual 
framework for improving regulatory design. 
C. Improving Accountability and Transparency 
The third theme around which EPA and its stakeholders coalesced in the CWAP is the 
need to improve accountability and transparency.236  As it did in identifying the Plan’s first two 
themes, EPA acknowledged that it “lacks nationally consistent and complete information on the 
facilities, permits, pollutant discharges and compliance status of most NPDES-regulated 
facilities.”237  Data problems exist across the board, including “data quality, accuracy, and 
completeness.”238  Inevitably, the infrastructure problem these data gaps represent “affects the 
ability of EPA and states to identify violations . . . , connect violations to water quality impacts, 
and to share information with the public.”239  The Plan notes that the “breadth and expanding 
scope of the NPDES regulated universe” heightens the challenge of responding to the long-
standing data problems.240  The CWAP indicates that, because of the size of the challenge and 
the costs involved (it would cost over $100 million/year to generate the data EPA would like to 
have), EPA will explore new ways to fill these data gaps, including using technological 
advances.241 
Innovative information-gathering technologies may facilitate the ability of regulators and 
potential private enforcers to identify regulatory violations.  Geographic information systems, 
global positioning satellite technologies, and remote sensing devices already support the 
investigation and enforcement of environmental laws in ways that were not previously 
possible.242  Some of this technology is available to the public at little or no cost from federal or 
state agencies.243  These technologies produce data that are more finely grained than cruder, 
                                                             
236 Thus, this theme relates directly to the third and fifth components of effective regulation described in Part IA, 
verifiability and legitimacy. 
237 CWAP, supra note 29, at 10. 
238 Id. 
239 Id.  
240 Id.  
241 See 78 Fed. Reg. 76,005 (July 30, 2013) (proposed rulemaking to require electronic reporting to address quality, 
accuracy, completeness, and timeliness concerns associated with its data).  See Christian Latham, Digitizing 
Environmental Protrection, REGBLOG (Dec. 5, 2013), available at http://www.regblog.org/2013/12/05-latham-
digitizing-environmental-protection.html (discussing the capacity of the proposed rule to enhance enforcement 
under the CWA against smaller facilities such as stormwater dischargers). 
242 See Peter Stokely, Using Aerial Photography, Geospatial Data, and GIS to Support the Enforcement of 
Environmental Statutes, 28-Summer NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 38 (2013).  Remote sensing is “the science and art 
of obtaining information about an object, area, or phenomenon through the analysis of data acquired by a device not 
in contact with the object, area, or phenomenon under investigation.”  Kenneth J. Markowitz, Legal Challenges and 
Market Rewards to the Use and Acceptance of Remote Sensing and Digital Information as Evidence, 12 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 219, 221 (2002).  According to Dave Owen, “increased data availability, new software 
systems, and exponentially greater computer power have combined to turn spatial analysis – that is quantitative 
analysis of data coded to specific geographic coordinates – into the coin of the environmental realm.”  Dave Owen, 
Mapping, Modeling, and the Fragmentation of Environmental Law, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 219, 222.  Owen suggests 
that “[t]he emergence of spatial analysis merits revisiting environmental law’s traditional debates about integrative, 
holistic decisionmaking,” although he refers to geographic and temporal rather than process-oriented fragmentation 
and does not address the implications of spatial analysis for enforcement.  Id. at 223.   
243 Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 115, 156-57 (2004) (noting 
that new technologies may “provide on-the-ground monitoring of environmental conditions from anywhere, at any 
time, at increasingly low cost,” revolutionizing responses to environmental problems”).  See also Grabosky, supra 
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previously available data and that can be more helpful in identifying environmental conditions, 
violations, and violators.  The data can strengthen the deterrent impact of regulations and foster 
higher compliance levels if regulated entities recognize that ease of access to information may 
make it easier for enforcers to prove violations.244 
Invoking the experience with the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program, the CWAP 
also touts the promise of transparency as a tool to improve compliance.245  EPA suggests that 
public pressure and greater regulated party self-awareness can both motivate better performance.  
For our purposes, the key point is that, in identifying strategies to improve compliance, EPA is 
looking well beyond ex post enforcement and considering a range of tools throughout the 
regulatory process.  In doing so, it is by no means dismissing the value of traditional 
enforcement; it is simply calling for use of additional tools to address compliance challenges, a 
position we have taken in previous work246 and which academic literatures support.247  
According to EPA, “[t]ransparency is not a replacement for regulatory enforcement, but can be 
an effective driver for improved performance and accountability.”248  As others have noted, 
changes in information technology can affect phases of the regulatory process other than ex post 
enforcement.  Better information, for example, can contribute to the adoption of more effective 
regulation, planning, and permitting, which in turn can affect the extent of compliance and the 
need for enforcement.249 
The CWAP’s third theme illustrates how considerations relating to hybrid governance 
and the dynamic nature of the regulatory environment can affect regulatory design choices, and 
that these aspects of regulatory design may affect key characteristics of effective regulation, 
including verifiability, the creation of appropriate compliance incentives, and regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
note 81, at 118 (noting the potential for digital technology to citizen enhance to “assist in labor-intensive 
investigation of non-compliance”). 
244 Markowitz, supra note 242, at 228-29.  Earlier iterations of improved data collection technologies have had that 
effect.  See, e.g., Lesley K. McAllister, Enforcing Cap-and-Trade: A Tale of Two Programs, 2 SAN DIEGO J. 
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 1, 4-8 (2010) (describing how continuous emissions monitoring equipment and automatic 
verification systems bolstered compliance levels under the CAA’s acid rain program). 
245 The TRI program was created by § 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, Pub. L. 
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1729, 1741 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11023).  It requires facilities that manufacture, 
process, or use listed toxic chemicals in amounts that exceed threshold quantities to submit to EPA and state 
officials toxic chemical release forms.  This information is meant to inform persons about toxic chemical releases, 
assist research and data gathering, and aid in the development of appropriate regulations.  42 U.S.C. § 11023(h).  
The TRI program may not be an ideal model for improving transparency and verifiability.  See, e.g., M.B. Pell, Ryan 
McNeill & Selam Genrakidan, Exclusive: U.S. system for flagging hazardous chemicals is widely flawed, REUTERS, 
July 8, 2013, http://mobile.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSBRE9670K720130708 (describing 
investigation concluding that the TRI program is plagued by scant government oversight and by incomplete or 
inaccurate reporting by regulated entities, and charging that EPA and most states “make no effort to verify the 
[reported] data”). 
246 See Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note __.  Cf. Robert L. Glicksman & Dietrich H. Earnhart, 
The Relative Efficacy of Coercive and Cooperative Enforcement Approaches to Water Pollution Control, in NEXT 
GENERATION COMPLIANCE, supra note 15, at __ (discussing deterrence-based, cooperative, and “responsive” 
regulatory approaches). 
247 See, e.g., GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3; NEXT GENERATION COMPLIANCE, supra note 15. 
248 CWAP, supra note 29, at 10.  
249 See, e.g., Robert Thomason, More Data from Environmental Monitoring Now Supports Environmental Policy, 
Rules, 45 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 191 (Jan. 17, 2014) (discussing the impacts of scientific sensing equipment on 
programs to enhance water quality in the Chesapeake Bay). 
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legitimacy.  The range and relative attractiveness of regulatory design options, both for 
regulation as whole and for enforcement aspects of it,  will shift over time as technology 
advances, government capacity evolves in other ways, and more is learned about what works and 
what doesn’t in achieving desired environmental results.  Regulatory design decisions should 
take full account of these contextual aspects of regulation. 
D. Enhancing Reinvention through Holistic Regulatory Evaluation 
While EPA’s effort to improve enforcement and compliance efforts under the CWAP 
reflect many of the aspects of our multi-layered approach to regulatory design, the application of 
our framework to the initiative raises questions about several features of the CWAP.  In this 
section, we provide a few examples of how a more complete accounting of all of the layers of 
our model for the design of regulatory enforcement and compliance programs might enrich 
EPA’s analysis of each element of its CWAP.250 
 The first theme of EPA’s CWAP centers on expanding the range of enforcement efforts 
to cover regulated sources previously ignored or deemphasized.  EPA reasons that the discharges 
of small sources, particularly in the aggregate, have the potential to create significant adverse 
public health and environmental effects.  Implicit in EPA’s decision to sweep these sources into 
the agency’s enforcement program is that doing so should increase the prospects of achieving 
desired levels of water quality.  EPA may well prove to be correct, and as a normative matter we 
hope so. 
Conceptually, we encourage systematic consideration of the role our five key components 
of effective enforcement and compliance might play as part of this new initiative.  For example, 
are there strategies that would improve the regulated community’s understanding of its 
regulatory obligations and how to meet them, as Colorado did with hazardous waste small 
quantity generators (our clarity component)?251  Smaller facilities are less likely than larger 
counterparts to have access to sophisticated technical and legal advice.252  EPA has undertaken 
such outreach in other settings.253  Similarly, what are the implications of achievability for EPA’s 
enforcement strategies for smaller facilities?  Are there steps EPA can and should take in light of 
any achievability issues that are likely to materialize with respect to smaller facilities in 
particular?  Verifiability is a third component that deserves careful consideration in determining 
how best to regulate a large universe of smaller facilities.  Are there additional steps EPA should 
consider to facilitate effective self-monitoring?  Or actions that could facilitate more effective 
government (EPA or state) monitoring and reporting?  NGO capacity to participate in the 
verifiability component is worth attention as well.   
                                                             
250 These examples are intended to be illustrative of the value of using a conceptual framework of the sort we 
propose in this article in considering reforms to the enforcement and compliance promotion function, rather than to 
serve as a comprehensive assessment of options to enhance the CWAP. 
251 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. 
252 Cf. Lisa Spagnolo, Rats in the Kaleidoscope: Rationality, Irrationality, and the Economics and Psychology of 
Opting in and Out of the CISG (Kaleidoscope Part II), 13 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COMM. L. & ARBITRATION 157, 159 
(2009) (“As legal advice is a form of information cost, small-medium businesses face proportionately higher 
information costs, and are therefore more prone to imperfectly informed decision making and concurrent efficiency 
losses from less-suitable choices of law.”). 
253 EPA’s website on Compliance Assistance, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/assistance/, provides access to many 
such outreach initiatives. 
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Our fourth and fifth components (the mix of rewards and sanctions, and legitimacy) 
should influence when EPA brings cases against large and small facilities, and the relief the 
agency should seek.  Perceptions of legitimacy may increase, for example, if EPA’s enforcement 
program targets all suspected significant violators, regardless of size, particularly if small sources 
create adverse effects analogous to those resulting from discharges by larger facilities.  On the 
other hand, coercive enforcement against small entities may seem unfair and overbearing to 
those sources if they lack adequate resources to comply, or if they lack the technical capacity to 
identify and quickly resolve problems.  EPA policies account for disparities in the regulated 
community in terms of ability to pay;254 applying these fourth and fifth commitments, it would 
be appropriate for the agency to consider proactively whether other special accommodations are 
appropriate in deciding which suits to initiate and what relief to seek.   
 Our framework also suggests the value of deepening the analysis in connection with 
EPA’s commitment in the second element of its plan to achieving a better integration of federal 
and state enforcement efforts.  EPA’s Plan does not address the role of citizen suits (an important 
aspect of hybrid governance in the enforcement and compliance promotion arena) in addressing 
the shortcomings it identified.  The availability of citizen suits complicates the challenges of 
rationalizing or integrating federal and state compliance inducement efforts because such suits 
make it possible for three enforcers with different interests and capacities to take steps to address 
particular alleged violations.  The challenges, and opportunities, are significant because of the 
significant number of actions citizen enforcers bring each year.255  Public enforcers have 
considerable discretionary authority over the fate of private enforcement; to use Professor 
Engstrom’s phrase, the major federal pollution control statutes empower EPA and the states to 
serve as “gatekeepers” with respect to citizen suits.256  Nevertheless, there are significant limits 
on EPA’s ability to influence citizen suit enforcers.  A fully integrated analysis of the role of 
public enforcement by federal and state authorities should include an assessment of strategies 
that would “rationalize” the use of citizen suits so that, in combination, the three sets of enforcers 
have the best change of halting significant violations and inducing desired levels of 
compliance.257  For example, weak gatekeeping is likely to create uncertainty for regulated 
entities (regarding the likelihood of suit, the types of relief to be sought, etc.).  But strong 
gatekeeping that significantly disables private enforcement may detract from the legitimacy of 
the regulatory program if it is perceived as an effort by captured regulators to block public 
participation in efforts to halt violations with significant public health or environmental 
implications.  While, therefore, we respectfully suggest that Professor Engstrom’s prescriptions 
for rationalizing public and private enforcement lose some force because they largely exclude 
state enforcement, EPA’s CWAP is similarly incomplete because it ignores the role of private 
enforcement.  A comprehensive effort to design an enforcement and compliance regime that is 
                                                             
254 Memorandum from Thomas L. Adams, Jr., to Assistant Administrators, Regional Administrators, Guidance on 
Determining a Violator’s Ability to Pay a Civil Penalty (Dec. 16, 1986), available at 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/civilpenalty-violators.pdf.  
255 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
256 See supra notes 110, 211 and accompanying text. 
257 For previous inquiries into the relationship between public and private enforcement in the context of citizen suit 
enforcement, see, e.g., Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions against Successive 
Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens, Part One: Statutory Bars and in Citizen Suit Provisions, 
28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 401 (2004); Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions against 
Successive Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens, Part Two: Statutory Preclusions on EPA 
Enforcement, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
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up to the challenges of hybrid governance needs to take account, at a minimum, of the roles of all 
three enforcers, of how regulated entities are likely to react to the enforcement strategies of each, 
and of how each enforcer’s effectiveness will be affected by the actions of the other two 
enforcers. 
 The CWAP’s failure to consider the role of private enforcers in the CWA’s hybrid 
enforcement program similarly may prevent the third aspect of EPA’s CWAP, reliance on new 
information technology to enhance accountability and transparency, from completely fulfilling 
its potential.  The dynamic nature of changes in information technology means that the 
economics, feasibility, and chances for success of enforcement will not remain static.  Better 
monitoring and the information it generates, for example, may motivate regulated parties not to 
violate the law in the first place, thereby influencing the universe of cases that deserve formal 
enforcement.  Better monitoring and information might heighten the willingness of private 
enforcers to pursue violators as information gathering costs decrease and the costs of success 
rise.  These developments may spur citizen suits that would not otherwise have been brought, 
adding to the chances that regulatory policy will be set in the context of private litigation in ways 
which the government deems unwise.258  As Professor Engstrom has noted, however, when 
Congress created citizen suit provisions, it took into account and implicitly endorsed 
enforcement by private litigants that public enforcers might choose not to pursue, thereby 
“conferring democratic legitimacy, though at a higher level of generality,” on such enforcement 
pursuits.259  Congress thus chose to forego a uniform enforcement regime in which expert federal 
agencies have the sole power to decide which enforcement actions will promote legislative goals, 
even though that might have been the best choice if its primary concern had been to avoid over-
deterrence.  Instead, Congress created a regime in which EPA shares its enforcement authority 
with states, largely for reasons rooted in a desire to promote federalism values.  It also shares that 
authority with private enforcers, whose inclusion in the enforcement equation arguably promotes 
legitimacy in addition to reflecting Congress’s intent to align enforcement capacity with levels of 
noncompliance warranting enforcement action in light of government resource constraints.  
These considerations are all relevant to policymakers as they consider the likely impacts of 
improved information technology on the preferred structure of enforcement and compliance 
programs. 
IV. Conclusion 
Enforcement is generally thought to be an indispensable feature of effective governance.  
The importance of using a holistic and systematic approach to consider reforms to agencies’ 
enforcement and compliance functions is difficult to overstate because of the interconnectedness 
of the different components of an effective regulatory regime.  Yet much agency effort to 
improve enforcement fails to account for the entirety of the administrative state’s tools to 
conduct its work.   
                                                             
258 This concern has gotten traction with some Supreme Court justices.  See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 209 (2000) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“A Clean Water Act plaintiff 
pursuing civil penalties acts as a self-appointed mini-EPA.”). 
259 Engstrom, supra note 3, at 638.  Because citizen suits are expressly authorized by statutes such as the CWA, and 
the statutes specify who can sue and under what circumstances, private individuals and NGOs that qualify to bring 
such suits are not self-appointed at all. 
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This article fills a gap in the law review literature by offering a comprehensive 
conceptual framework for considering how best to structure an enforcement and compliance 
promotion regime.  The “test run” we gave to the framework by applying it to a case study of an 
ongoing EPA effort to reinvent its enforcement strategies under the Clean Water Act illustrated, 
at least to us, the value of efforts of this sort to use a wide lens in considering reforms to 
enforcement and compliance efforts. 
